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SYSTÈME DE DÉTECTION D’ANOMALIES EN UTILISANT LES APPELS
SYSTÈME POUR UN TÉLÉPHONE INTELLIGENT BASÉ SUR LA PLATEFORME
ANDROID
Abdelfattah AMAMRA
RÉSUMÉ
Le téléphone intelligent est un téléphone mobile qui offre des fonctions avancées par rapport
aux téléphones portables traditionnels. Les systèmes des téléphones intelligents ont connu
une évolution énorme en termes de leurs capacités et fonctionnalités. Par conséquent, ils
sont utilisés de manière excessive, dans la vie personnelle et professionnelle. Les utilisateurs
des systèmes de téléphones intelligents conservent toute sorte d’informations personnelles,
professionnelles et confidentielles dans leurs appareils, comme celles des cartes de crédit et
des numéros bancaires. Compte tenu de cette popularité et la conservation des informations
confidentielles, les cybercriminels et les développeurs des programmes malveillants ont les
yeux rivés sur les systèmes de téléphone intelligent. Les récents rapports sur les programmes
malveillants montrent des informations effrayantes concernant des menaces qu’affrontent les
systèmes de téléphone intelligent. De ce fait, leurs protection est très importante.
Les techniques de détection des programmes malveillants affectant les téléphones intelligents
ont été activement étudiées. De manière générale, les deux grandes techniques sont: les tech-
niques basées sur la signature et celles basées sur l’anomalie. Chaque technique possède des
avantages et des inconvénients. Dans la présente thèse, nous sommes essentiellement intéressés
aux techniques de détection d’anomalie. Ces techniques nécessitent davantage d’études et de
recherches pour améliorer l’exactitude de la détection des programmes malveillants et pour
consommer le moins de ressources possible.
Cette thèse apporte des contributions sur trois niveaux en vue d’améliorer l’efficacité, l’exactitude
et l’adaptabilité des techniques basées sur l’anomalie concernant le système de téléphone in-
telligent fondé sur le système d’exploitation Android.
La première contribution présente une étude qui examine les techniques existantes de détec-
tion de logiciels malveillants. Cette analyse offre une classification complète des techniques
étudiées selon des critères bien définis. La deuxième contribution est basé sur le niveau de don-
nées qui est utilisée pour décrire le comportement d’application et son double caractère. Pre-
mièrement, nous introduisons la représentation du vecteur-caractéristique des données comme
étant un nouveau facteur qui pourrait améliorer l’efficacité et l’exactitude de la solution de la
détection des programmes malveillants. Deuxièmement, nous introduisons le processus de fil-
trage et d’abstraction qui rafine les traces d’appel système. Les traces rafinées sont bien plus
compactes et refletent encore plus le comportement des applications. La troisième contribu-
tion est fondée sur le niveau du modèle de comportement normal et son double caractère. En
premier lieu, nous avons établi une base de données canonique représentant un comportement
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normal générique à partir d’un nombre limité d’applications représentatives. En second lieu, au
lieu d’utiliser un seul classificateur d’apprentissage automatique pour modéliser le comporte-
ment normal, nous avons utilisé un classificateur hybride d’apprentissage automatique.
Mot-clés : Détection des anomalies, Les appels système, Filtrage et abstraction, Classifica-
teur d’apprentissage automatique, Android, Système de téléphone intelligent
ANOMALY DETECTION SYSTEM USING SYSTEM CALLS FOR ANDROID
SMARTPHONE SYSTEM
Abdelfattah AMAMRA
ABSTRACT
A smartphone is a mobile phone that provides advanced functions compared to traditional
mobile phones. Smartphone systems have evolved considerably in terms of their capacity
and functionality. Therefore, it is excessively used in personal and business life. Users of
smartphone systems store all kinds of personal, business and confidential information on their
systems, such as credit card and bank account information. In view of this popularity and
storing confidential information, the cyber criminals and malware developers have set their
eyes on the smartphone systems. Recent malware analysis reports show scared information
about the serious threats that face smartphone systems. Thus, their protection is very important.
Smartphone malwares detection techniques have been actively studied. Broadly, the two main
techniques are: the signature-based techniques and the anomaly-based techniques. Each tech-
nique has its own advantages and drawbacks. In this Thesis, we are mainly interested in
anomaly detection techniques. These techniques are useful for unknown malwares and variants
of known ones. However, they still need more study and investigation to improve the malware
detection accuracy and to consume as less resources as possible.
This Thesis makes contributions on three levels to improve the efficiency, accuracy and adapt-
ability of anomaly-based techniques for smartphone system based on Android operating sys-
tem.
The first contribution presents a study and review of the existing malware detection techniques.
This survey provides a comprehensive classification of the studied techniques according to well
defined criteria.
The second contribution is based upon the dataset level and it is twofold. Firstly, we introduce
dataset feature vector representation as a new factor that can improve the efficiency and the ac-
curacy of malware detection solution. Secondly, we introduce filtering and abstraction process
that refines the system call traces. The refined traces are much more compact and are closer to
the main application behavior.
The third contribution of this Thesis is on the benign behavior model level and it is biflod. In
the first place, we build canonical database representing generic benign behavior from limited
number of representative applications. In the second place, instead of using single machine
learning classifier to model the benign behavior, we use hybrid machine learning classifier.
XKeywords: Anomaly detection, System calls, Filtering and abstraction, Machine learning
classifiers, Android, Smartphone system
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INTRODUCTION
Context of the Thesis
Over the last two decades, mobile phones have become cheaper, smaller, more sophisticated,
stylish and “smarter” than ever before. Initially, mobile phones were of large size and had
long antennas, short memory and lower battery life. The first commercial mobile phone was
released by Motorola in 1983. It cost around $4,000 and had a thirty minutes battery life along
with the capacity of storing only thirty contact numbers (Engineers’ Forum, 2013). Ever since,
mobile phone manufacturers have been producing phones with new features and higher capac-
ities. Twenty-four years after the first mobile phone was introduced, the first full touchscreen
mobile phone was unveiled by Apple. This new model was called iPhone, a new generation
of mobile phone with innovative features. The most important of these innovations was third-
party applications, which allow users to develop and run their own applications designed for
specific tasks. In the next year, the first Android mobile phone was introduced, the T-Mobile
G1 or HTC Dream, which had a slide-out keyboard and limited touchscreen. Android is an
open source mobile operating system used for a wide range of mobile devices.
Figure 0.1 (Engineers’ Forum, 2013) summarizes the evolution of mobile phones. Mobile
phones have evolved considerably in terms of their capacity, technology and functionality.
Mobile phones today are as powerful as personal computers.
A smartphone is a mobile phone that provides advanced functions as compared to traditional
mobile phones. Smartphone systems have the capability to take photos with a high resolution
camera, play music, receive and send emails, play games, surf the web and run third-party
applications, functions which were unimaginable in earlier versions of mobile phones. The
importance and the use of smartphone systems continue to grow rapidly. According to the In-
ternational Data Corporation (IDC), 305 million smartphone units were shipped in 2010 (IDC,
2011), and this number is expected to surpass 1.4 billion units in 2015, accounting for 69 % of
all smart connected device shipments worldwide (IDC, 2013). Figure 0.2 illustrates the market
share forecast for desktop PCs, portable PCs, tablets and smartphones.
2With third-party applications, smartphone systems provide a wide range of functions. In the last
three years, more than 300,000 applications have been developed. As specified by a new IDC
forecast, the market of smartphone applications will continue to grow, as the annual mobile ap-
plication downloads on smartphone systems, tablets, and similarly specified mobile computing
devices will increase from 87.8 billion in 2013 to 187 billion in 2017. In addition, revenues
will experience similar growth, as they are forecast to increase from $10.3 billion in 2013 to
$25.2 billion in 2017 (John, 2013).
Figure 0.1 The evolution of mobile phones
Taken from (Engineers’ Forum, 2013).
Smartphone systems have become so useful and important in personal and business life. Users
can store all kinds of confidential and important information on their devices, such as credit
3card and bank account information. The popularity and the confidential information are two
attractive things for cyber criminals and malware developers. In the last decade, smartphone
systems have become an important target of malware developers.
Figure 0.2 Worldwide smart connected device forcast
(IDC, 2013).
The story of smartphone malwares started in 2004. In that year, security researchers made the
first smartphone worm named Cabir (CNCCS, 2010; Chen and Peikari, 2008). It is a worm that
was developed as proof of concept to infect Symbian-based devices and spread via Bluetooth
as a *.sis package. In the same year, the Trojan Qdial (CNCCS, 2010; Chen and Peikari, 2008)
was found as cracked copy of Symbian game, Mosquitos. This malware would send SMS
massage to premium rates services, making it the first malware to take money from its victims.
By 2005, smartphone malware was declared as an information theft. Pbstealer (CNCCS, 2010;
Chen and Peikari, 2008) is a malware that copies all information from an address book and then
tries to send them via Bluetooth. Commwarrior (CNCCS, 2010; Chen and Peikari, 2008) is the
first malware to spread via MMS, instead of Bluetooth. It is a harmless malware, but represents
4a major step in the smartphone malwares evolution. By early 2006, smartphone malware was
targeting platforms other than Symbian, such as Windows CE and J2ME.
By 2010, the first Android trojan named AndroidOS.DroidSMS.A (Passeri, 2011) was intro-
duced, which was a Russian SMS fraud application. In the same year, another trojan named
DROIDSMS.A (Passeri, 2011) was discovered in the game TapSnake, which would transmit the
GPS location of the infected devices. Android has become the most targeted mobile platform.
Smartphone malwares keep growing both technologically and structurally. They are increas-
ingly becoming smarter and harder to detect, as illustrated in Table 0.1. Moreover, their num-
ber keeps increasing every year. Kaspersky Lab published an analysis report of smartphone
threats (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014). The report provides shocking information about
smartphone threats such as:
• Android remains the most targeted platform by 98.05 % of malicious attacks detected in
2013.
• Approximately 143,000 new malwares for smartphone systems have been detected in 2013.
The number is three times greater than the previous year.
• In 2013, the cybercriminals have used nearly 4 million installation packages to distribute
malwares for smartphone systems.
• A total of 10 million unique malicious installation packages targeting smartphone systems
have been detected overall 2012-2013.
• The majority of malwares in 2013 are used to steal users’ money.
More and more users and businesses use smartphone systems as computing appliances for
both private and work life. Smartphone malwares are real and reach far beyond simple abusive
behavior. Therefore, the need for efficient smartphone malwares detection solution is now
crucial. This solution should be adequate with available system resources and should have as
5Table 0.1 Smartphone malwares capabilities evolution.
Smartphone malwares capabilities 2004 2014
Spread via Bluetooth Yes Yes
Show messages from cybercriminals No Yes
Send SMS No Yes
Intercept SMS No Yes
Steal contacts No Yes
Steal banking data No Yes
Steal control bank account No Yes
Steal stored files No Yes
Steal data from other apps No Yes
Record phone calls No Yes
Redirect or block phone calls No Yes
Block device No Yes
Erase all data No Yes
high performance as possible in terms of security protection while consuming as less system
resources as possible.
Problem statement
In the last few years, smartphone malware detection techniques have been actively studied.
Prior work has shown that the two main adopted techniques were: signature-base techniques
and anomaly-based techniques (Amamra et al., 2012b). Each technique has its own strengths
and drawbacks.
Signature-based techniques model the known malwares in the form of signatures or patterns,
and use these signatures in the detection process (Amamra et al., 2012b). All signatures are
stored in a database. This database is searched when the detector attempts to identify whether
a program is malicious or not. To keep the malware detector accurate and efficient, the sig-
nature database must be updated as soon as new signatures are available. Generally, malware
signatures are sequence of bytecode (Rastogi et al., 2013) and/or hash values (Rastogi et al.,
2013; Cha et al., 2011).
6Signature-based techniques dominate the commercial malware detection solutions. They are
very efficient and reliable to identify known malwares. However, they suffer from major draw-
backs:
• They cannot detect unknown malwares and variants of known malwares (Amamra et al.,
2012b).
• They are easily evaded by using different techniques, such as binary packers, encryption,
or self-modifying code, which means recycling existence malware with different signa-
tures (Rastogi et al., 2013; Christodorescu and Jha, 2006; Idika and Mathur, 2007).
• The signature extraction needs human expertise intervention, which is time consuming.
The average time required for signature-based antivirus solution to detect new malware is
48 days (Schmidt, 2011).
• The malware developers are increasingly using complex obfuscation techniques, which
make the code analysis more difficult, along with making signature extraction harder and
time consuming. Similarly, the antivirus requires more time to detect the malware (Cheby-
shev and Unuchek, 2014).
• Zhou and Jiang (2012) evaluated four popular antivirus software with 1260 malware sam-
ples (Zhou and Jiang, 2012). The highest and lowest accuracy rates that were found are
illustrated in Table 0.2. The results show clearly that the commercial antiviruses need more
improvement to ensure the smartphone system protection.
Table 0.2 Commercial antivirus malware detection rate
Taken from (Zhou and Jiang, 2012).
AVG Lookout Norton Trend Micro
Nb % Nb % Nb % Nb %
689 54,70% 1003 79,60% 254 20,20% 966 76,70%
Anomaly-based detection techniques are more interesting from the perspective of evasion at-
tacks, obfuscation techniques and detection of unknown malwares. Instead of malware signa-
7tures database, anomaly-based detection techniques broadly construct benign behavior profiles
during the training phase. In the detection phase, any deviations from these profiles are con-
sidered anomalous. These two phases are illustrated in Figure 0.3.
Figure 0.3 The phases of anomaly-based techniques.
In order, to be effective, anomaly-based techniques must have a stable and consistent benign be-
havior profiles. Constructing these profiles is not simple, especially for complex programs. In-
adequate profiles of benign behavior lead to low accuracy and high false positive rate (Amamra
et al., 2012b).
To construct robust benign behavior profiles, different approaches such as Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) (Xie et al., 2010), Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Bose et al., 2008), and
k-means (Burguera et al., 2011) have been implemented. These algorithms have been used on
different datasets: system calls (Burguera et al., 2011), system resource usage (Shabtai et al.,
82012), requested permission (Sanz et al., 2013; Aung and Zaw, 2013), API calls (Aafer et al.,
2013; Kim et al., 2012).
These approaches usually produce accurate benign behavior profiles with low rates of false
positive alarms. Unfortunately, this generally comes at expensive price of computational and
space complexities. These complexities represent an important burden for limited resource
environments such as smartphone systems.
In spite of efforts made by researchers to produce efficient smartphone system anomaly-based
solution, there are still two major problems:
• Anomaly-based detection solution for smartphone system still needs improvements to in-
crease the detection rate of malwares. The solution should effectively detect all types of
malwares (new malwares, known malwares, variant of known malwares) with very low
false positive rate. The poor accuracy performance is caused by different factors; such as
the used data is unrepresentative of the application behavior, the amount of used data is
insufficient and/or using inappropriate benign behavior model.
• Smartphone hardware industry keeps its evolution of improving mobile device resources
(increase memory size and CPU performance), but at the same time, mobile software keeps
growing and requires more memory space and computational time. Therefore, anomaly-
based detection solution for smartphone system should be adequate with available system
resources and consume as less system resources as possible.
Thus, in this Thesis, we address these two issues to reach the objectives mentioned the next
section.
Objectives and contributions
Our primary goal is to revisit the anomaly-based detection techniques based on system call
dataset with two conflicting objectives in mind:
9• Augment the accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of the solutions.
• Reduce the time and space complexities of the solutions.
To tackle these objectives, this Thesis presents contributions mainly on three levels:
a. Prior work study level
We carefully studied and reviewed the existing smartphone malware detection techniques.
We provided a structured and comprehensive classification of those techniques according
to well defined and structured criteria: the reference behavior, the analysis techniques, the
algorithms and the dataset used to construct the model. This survey helps us to understand
the current trends in smartphone malware detection techniques, identify the advantages
and the drawbacks of each technique, and explore possible new trends and improvements.
b. Dataset level
To improve the detection accuracy of malwares, earlier work investigated only two factors:
first, the used dataset (size and type) and second, the used algorithm to model the benign
behavior. Our contribution on dataset level is twofold:
• Firstly, we introduce and investigate feature vector representation factor. feature vec-
tor is the format of how data is organized and represented. This format is used during
the training phase of the classifier as well as the detection phase. The investigated
feature vectors are:
– Successive system calls, where the ordering information between system calls in
sequence is considered. This feature vector has been used in prior work.
– Bag of system calls, where the successiveness of system calls in sequence is dis-
regarded, and only the frequency of each system call is preserved. This feature
vector has been used in prior work.
– Patterns frequency system calls feature vector combines features of two previous
vectors. Pattern-frequency feature vector regards the successive order information
of system calls in short pattern, and regards the frequency of each pattern in the
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sequence. To the best of our knowledge, this representation has not been studied
in the past in this context.
The process of preparing feature vectors has light computational and space complexi-
ties which make it a suitable approach for smartphone malwares detection techniques.
• Secondly, we introduce a process named the filtering and abstraction process. A
similar idea has been used in the past in different contexts (Wang et al., 2009). This
process refines the system call traces and filters out system calls that are irrelevant to
describe the main behavior of applications, such as system calls to maintain process
information, system calls to check resources availability, inter-process communication
system calls, memory management system calls and failed system calls. This process
also unifies system calls having the same functionality but using different names. For
example, the system calls read(), readv(), pread() and fread() have similar function,
read data from a file are considered as one system call.
The filtering and abstraction process produces refined traces. These traces have two main
advantages over the raw traces:
• The refined traces are much more compact. This reduces the resources needed to store
and process these traces for anomaly detection.
• The refined traces should give a better description of the behavior of applications.
This description is expected to have positive impact on the classification accuracy of
the anomaly-based detection approach.
c. Benign behavior model level
Benign behavior model is an important factor that impacts the accuracy performance
of the anomaly-based detection technique. An inappropriate benign behavior model in-
creases the false positive rate. Therefore, our contribution on benign behavior model level
is twofold:
• Firstly, we adopt and extend the classical lightweight anomaly detection approach pro-
posed by (Forrest et al., 1996). The benign behavior of a legitimate application can
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be described by a database composed of all the unique system call patterns of a given
length k encountered during a training phase (Forrest et al., 2008; Hofmeyr et al.,
1998). Unfortunately, there are millions of applications available for Android system.
It is unlikely that all the legitimate applications would have their authenticated sys-
tem call database describing their benign behavior. Hence, our contribution is to build
a canonical database representing generic benign behavior of Android applications.
Our approach is to build this database from a limited number of representative appli-
cations. If the behavior of any application deviates from the behavior described by
the canonical database, it should be reported as a suspicious/malicious application. In
an in-depth protection strategy, this may represent the last opportunity to detect any
malicious activity of a given application.
• Secondly, the prior work investigated and evaluated benign behavior model that pro-
duced by training only single machine learning classifiers, such as support vector ma-
chine (SVM) (Bose et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2011), decision tree and Naïve Bayes (Shab-
tai et al., 2012) for smartphone malwares detection problem. Therefore, we enhance
the accuracy of malware detection process by modeling the benign behavior by train-
ing hybrid machine learning classifiers. A hybrid classifier combines two or more
different single classifiers to improve classification process performance and reduce
false positive rate. Thereby, hybrid classifier is more accurate and better candidate
to make accurate malware detector. Stacked generalization or stacking is proposed
by Wolpert (1992) is used to combine the two single classifiers. The main idea of
stacking approach is to combine multiple classifiers by training the meta-level clas-
sifier by the output predictions of the base-level classifier, this allows correcting the
misclassified instances and improving the prediction accuracy.
Methodology
To achieve the objectives and the contributions of Thesis, the following methodology is adapted:
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• We study the Android security mechanisms and architecture and identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the current mechanisms. As well as, we give a special attention to identify
the possible alternatives for integrating a new mechanism that can improve the performance
of the current mechanisms.
• We review smartphone malware detection systems and identify their weaknesses. Then,
we explore the opportunities for improvement. Complexity analysis methods are used to
compare different mechanisms according to their memory and time complexities.
• We propose a new malware detection system that is based on anomaly detection techniques.
The new detection system is host-based since all malwares get installed on the device with
the approval of users themselves. However, the smartphone resources are limited, the new
detection system should be efficient and fit the available resources.
• We test and evaluate the proposed detection system on real benign and malicious applica-
tions. We evaluate its accuracy performances as well as the system resources consumption.
Structure of Thesis
This Thesis is organized in introduction, six chapters and conclusion as follows:
• The introduction explains the context of the Thesis, presents the problem statement and our
intended objectives and contributions.
• Chapter 1 provides the basic background of Android smartphone system, Android security
mechanism and their limitations and presents an overview of smartphone system security
threats.
• Chapter 2 presents the relevant state-of-the-art techniques, methods, algorithms, and dataset
related to the smartphone anomaly malware detections, along with their advantages and
drawbacks.
• Chapter 3 describes Linux system calls and the importance and the limitations of using it as
dataset in anomaly detection problem. As well as, we introduce our contributions on dataset
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level, which presented in the different feature vector representations and the filtering and
abstraction process.
• Chapter 4 presents the canonical benign behavior database approach. In this approach, the
benign behavior of Android application is presented in a canonical database constructed
from a limited number of representative applications.
• Chapter 5 compares between the two main categories of machine learning classifiers: gen-
erative classifiers and discriminative classifiers by choosing classifier from each category.
k-means is selected to represent the generative category and support vector machine (SVM)
is selected to represent the discriminative category. In this chapter, we examine the impact
of filtering and abstraction process on the performance and accuracy of the two classifiers.
The hybrid classifiers using stacking approach is presented in chapter 6.
• Finally, in our conclusion, we summarize the work accomplished during the Thesis, the
contributions and prospects for the future.

CHAPTER 1
BACKGOUND: ANDROID SECURITY MECHANISM AND THREATS
1.1 Android software stack
Android dominates smartphone operating systems market nearly 85% of the market share in
the second quarter of 2014 (IDC, 2014). Android is an open-source software stack for a wide
range of smartphone systems and tablets. It incorporates an operating system, middleware,
and key applications. It consists of 5 layers as illustrated in Figure 1.1 (source.android.com,
2014; Gandhewar and Sheikh, 2010; Song et al., 2010; Shabtai et al., 2009a). The top layer
is the application layer for implementing native and third-party applications, such as phone
application, internet browser and media player application.
Android applications directly interact with classes of the application framework layer. These
classes manage the basic functions of smartphone system. The most important classes are:
(i) Activity manager manages the activity life cycle of applications, (ii) Content providers
manage the data sharing between applications, (ii) Telephone manager manages all voice calls,
(iv) Location manager manages locations and (v) Resource manager manages various types of
resources (source.android.com, 2014; Gandhewar and Sheikh, 2010; Song et al., 2010; Shabtai
et al., 2009a).
The next layer in Android software stack is native libraries. All libraries are written in C/C++,
and they enable the smartphone system to handle various types of data. For instance, playback
and recording different video and audio formats are supported by media framework library,
Libc supports system C libraries, SGL and OpenGL are graphics library to support 2D and 3D
graphics, and SQLite is a database engine (source.android.com, 2014; Gandhewar and Sheikh,
2010; Song et al., 2010; Shabtai et al., 2009a).
Android runtime layer is located on the same level as the libraries layer. It includes core li-
braries and Dalvik virtual machine. Core libraries provide most functions of java libraries and
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additional Android specific functions. Dalvik VM is a register based virtual machine optimized
to execute applications of (.dex) format on limited resources devices. The Dalvik VM relies
on Linux kernel for underlying functionalities, such as threading and low-level memory man-
agement (source.android.com, 2014; Gandhewar and Sheikh, 2010; Song et al., 2010; Shabtai
et al., 2009a).
Android is based on Linux kernel version 2.6. Linux kernel is an abstraction layer between
the hardware and the rest layers of the software stack. It is responsible for device drivers,
such as camera and GPS, power management, memory management, security and network-
ing (source.android.com, 2014; Gandhewar and Sheikh, 2010; Song et al., 2010).
Figure 1.1 Android software stack architecture
Taken from (source.android.com, 2014).
1.2 Android security mechanism overview
Securing an open-source software stack requires robust and rigorous security mechanism. An-
droid was designed with multi-layered security mechanism, which provides the flexibility re-
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quired for an open-source platform, while providing protection for user data and system re-
sources, such as networking and storage (Shabtai et al., 2009a; source.android.com, 2014).
Android security mechanism broadly relies on two main security mechanisms: Linux secu-
rity mechanism and Android application security mechanism, which are presented in the next
subsections.
1.2.1 Linux security
Linux kernel is stable and secure kernel, trusted by many corporations and security profession-
als. Linux kernel provides Android with various security features including: process isolation,
access permission model and extensible mechanism for memory protection (source.android.com,
2014; Shabtai et al., 2009a).
1.2.1.1 Sandboxes
Android inherits Linux sandbox feature to enforce inter-application separation. Each Android
application is executed in a separate process. The Android system assigns a unique user ID
(UID) to each installed application (source.android.com, 2014; Shabtai et al., 2009a). Sand-
box feature isolates applications from each other and from the system. Consequently, each
application data and resources are prevented from being used by other applications. Conceptu-
ally, a sandbox is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
In order for two applications to be executed in the same process, they must be signed by the
same private key and share the same UID by declaring sharedUserId attribute in the Android-
Manifest.xml file of each application. By doing this, the two applications are then treated as
being the same application.
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Figure 1.2 Linux sandbox security feature.
1.2.1.2 File access
Android relies on Linux discretionary access control (DAC) (Smalley and Craig, 2013; Shabtai
et al., 2009a) to protect both applications and system files. Each file is associated with user
and group identifier (UID and GID, respectively) and three tuples read, write and execute per-
missions. Generally, Android system files are owned by superuser or root user, and application
files are owned by application user ID (UID). This mechanism prevents one application from
directly accessing or altering the files of the system or files of other applications through kernel
interfaces.
1.2.1.3 Memory management
Android is enhanced with many memory management features (source.android.com, 2014) that
make common memory corruption issues harder to exploit, including:
• Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to deny code execution on the stack and heap.
• Linux mmap_min_addr to mitigate null pointer dereference privilege escalation.
• Address space layout randomization (ASLR) and ProPolice to protect from buffer over flow
attack.
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• Format string vulnerability protections.
1.2.2 Android application security
Additional finer-grained security features are provided at application level to enforce more
Android security mechanisms. The two main security features are: application permission and
application signing (source.android.com, 2014). First, by default, Android applications cannot
access sensitive system resources, such as camera, GPS and network. These functions are
protected by security feature known as permissions. Second, all Android applications must be
signed digitally by a private key. The signing process identifies application’s developer and
detect if the application code altered. These two features are detailed in the following text.
1.2.2.1 Application permission
Third-party applications can access various system resources and data through a set of APIs.
By default, Android applications cannot use the sensitive APIs that access network, device sen-
sors, reading or writing private information, such as address book, or access other applications
files. To use these sensitive APIs, Android application must explicitly declare the required per-
missions in its AndroidManifest.xml file (source.android.com, 2014; developer.android.com,
2014a).
Applications statically declare the permissions they need using <uses-permission> tags in An-
droidManifestfile.xml. At the time of application’s installation, Android system displays the
requested permissions to the user, and asks whether to accept and continue the installation, or
to deny and cancel installation as presented in Figure 1.3. User cannot accept some permissions
and deny others. User must accept or deny all requested permission as a block.
Android system adopts the approach of showing the requested permissions prior to installation
rather than other approaches for many reasons. This approach allows user to review infor-
mation about application, developer and functions before establishing a mental of financial
commitment, as well as to determine whether it corresponds to their needs and expectations.
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Figure 1.3 Display of requested permissions at application
installation time.
The APIs that are protected with permissions can be clustered in four categories: cost-sensitive
APIs, personal information APIs, sensitive data input devices and device metadata, as showed
in Figure 1.4.
• Cost-sensitive APIs: this category represents any function that might charge a cost for the
user or the network. The APIs used to access these functions are protected with permission
security feature. These APIs include: Telephony, SMS/MMS, Network/Data and In-App
Billing.
• Personal information APIs: this category groups the APIs that provide access to sensitive
information of user, such as contacts, emails and calendar.
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• Sensitive data input devices: Smartphones are equipped with sensitive data input devices,
such as camera, GPS and microphone. The APIs set to access these functions are protected
by permission security feature.
• Device metadata: broadly, information such operating system logs, user browsing history,
phone number and hardware/ network identification are not sensitive. However, they can
describe the user behavior and their preferences, as well as the system usage and perfor-
mance. Therefore, the APIs used to access the information are protected by permission
security feature.
Figure 1.4 Classes of sensitive protected APIs.
1.2.2.2 Application signing
Each Android application must be digitally signed with a certificate whose private key is owned
by the developer. Google play (official Android applications market) and the system will not
accept an application that is not signed. The purpose of application singing is: (i) to identify
the application’s developer, (ii) to prevent application code and/or contents from altering and
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(iii) to establish trust between applications to share code and data in a secure manner (devel-
oper.android.com, 2014a; source.android.com, 2014).
Application signing in Android is simple and developers can use self-signed certificate. There
is no need for a certificate authority. Android provides two modes for signing applications:
debug mode and release mode. Debug mode is used when the developer is developing and
testing an application. While release mode is used when the developer wants to build and re-
lease version of an application that can be distributed to be used or published on an application
marketplace, such as Google Play (developer.android.com, 2014a).
1.3 Android security mechanism limitations
Android security mechanism is varied and provides different capabilities of protection and pre-
vention. However, some security limitations exist that will be discussed in this section (Shabtai
et al., 2009a) as follow:
• Users cannot accept only subsets of the permissions required by an application, it is an “all
or nothing” policy. Indeed, a user should accept all the required permissions to allow the
installation of a given application. These permissions are supposed to represent the mini-
mum set of services without which the application cannot perform the tasks it was created
for. However, in many cases, application developers exaggerate in requiring permissions,
usually greater numbers of permissions are not really needed. For example, a weather fore-
cast application requests permission to send an SMS, record audio, add or modify personal
information, and directly call phone numbers. All those permissions have no relation with
normal purposes of the application.
• There is no way to verify that an application is using the granted permissions only for be-
nign purposes. In addition, the current security mechanism does not prevent the application
from using granted permissions for malicious purposes, nor does it notify the user when an
abuse is detected.
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• During the installation process, when prompted to check the permissions requested by a
new application, most of the users, unaware of security risks, tend to click “Yes, Ok, Ac-
cept, Install, etc.”. Later, the consequences of any bad use of the granted permissions fall
on the shoulders of users.
• There is no dynamic way to constraint or revoke subset of permissions, the only way to
revoke the application permissions is to uninstall the application.
• Android does not have any runtime investigation mechanism for the application’s behavior.
Once an application is installed, it can do whatever it wants.
1.4 Smartphone system security threats
There are various security threats that can threaten smartphone system. These threats can
be broadly classified into four classes (Dunham, 2008; lookout mobile security report, 2011;
Zhou and Jiang, 2012): application-base threats, web-based threats, network-based threats and
physical threats. These classes are discussed in more details in the next subsections.
1.4.1 Application based threats
Installing third party applications presents a security threat to mobile platform. There are
applications developed with malicious tends, and other applications can be exploited for mali-
cious purposes (Dunham, 2008; lookout mobile security report, 2011; Zhou and Jiang, 2012).
Application-based threats can be one of the following forms:
• Malware is an application that is developed to execute malicious behavior on a smartphone
system. For example, a malware performs actions without a user’s knowledge, such as
making phone calls, sending SMS/MMS messages, or executing undesirable commands
and programs to give an attacker remote control over the device. Malware can also steal
sensitive information and send it outside the device, which leads to identity theft or financial
fraud (Dunham, 2008; lookout mobile security report, 2011).
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• Privacy threats caused by applications that are not necessarily malicious. Those applica-
tions gather or use sensitive information, such as GPS location, contact lists, phone calls
activity, or personal identifiable information that are not necessary to perform their function
or more than their needs (Dunham, 2008; lookout mobile security report, 2011).
• Threat caused by vulnerable applications that have not malicious behavior, but have vul-
nerabilities, which can be exploited for malicious purposes. Such vulnerabilities can allow
the attacker to gain full access to a mobile device (Dunham, 2008; lookout mobile security
report, 2011).
The aim of this Thesis is to propose a solution that tackle this type of threats. Therefore,
malicious applications threats is explained in more details in Section 1.5.
1.4.2 Network based threats
Smartphone supports variety of wireless communications channels, cellular network, WiFi
local network, Bluetooth as well. Every channel can be exploited by mobile malware to infect
the handheld device.
• Bluetooth was the first channel targeted by smartphone malwares to infect systems and
distribute themselves. Cabir was the first malware that used Bluetooth channel to infect
smartphone systems (Dunham, 2008).
• Exploiting network software flaws such SMS/MMS is a serious security threat. (Mulliner and Miller,
2009; Mulliner and Vigna, 2006) identified new flaws in SMS and MMS software that can
be used for Denial-of-Service attacks and code execution.
• WiFi sniffer captures wireless network traffic to or from the smartphone system. Many ap-
plications and web pages send their data through WiFi channel which are not encrypted so
if the traffic is intercepted by anyone, this may lead to identity theft or financial fraud (Dun-
ham, 2008).
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1.4.3 Web based threats
Smartphone system constantly access Internet to check general web sites, read emails, Face-
book or Twitter. Web services threaten smartphone system security in different ways as fol-
lows:
• Phishing is a way to steal private and sensitive information such as usernames, passwords,
account numbers, social security numbers and credit card information by masquerading as
a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Fishers send out an email, message
text, Facebook or Twitter message that appears to be coming from a well-known and trusted
sender. The message contains a link which directs victims to enter private and financial
information at a spoofed website which appears identical to the legitimate one (Dunham,
2008).
• Web pages automatically start downloading a program, sometimes the user is prompted to
run the downloaded program, while in other times the program runs automatically (Dun-
ham, 2008; lookout mobile security report, 2011).
• Application exploit vulnerabilities in a web browser or any program that can be launched
via a web browser such as a flash player, PDF reader, or image viewer. Simply by visit-
ing a web page, an attacker can trigger a program to exploit browser vulnerabilities and
install malware or perform other malicious actions on a device (Dunham, 2008; lookout
mobile security report, 2011).
1.4.4 Physical threats
Smartphone is portable and contains sensitive and private user information. Therefore its
physical security is important. Lost or stolen mobile device constitutes a serious security
threat (lookout mobile security report, 2011).
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1.5 Malware threats
The term malware comes from two words: “malicious” and “software”. Malware is a malicious
code developed to disrupt system operation, access unauthorized system resources, execute
undesirable commands and programs, collect sensitive information and send it outside the
device, and other abusive behavior. Malware will also seek to exploit existing vulnerabilities
on systems making their entry quiet and easy (Chen and Peikari, 2008).
Malwares targeting smartphone systems are clearly on the rise. According to Kaspersky lab (Cheby-
shev and Unuchek, 2014), nowadays, These malwares are beyond than frivolity of individual
hacker, but serious industry involves various types of actors: malware writers, testers, interface
designers of both malwares and web pages that are used to distribute them, owners of programs
that spread the malwares, and the botnet owners.
The number of malwares targeting smartphone systems in 2013 was three times more than the
previous year, nearly 145,000 new samples. Malwares of smartphone systems have increased
quickly in short period of time. Over the course of 2011, Kaspersky Lap (Maslennikov, 2011)
recorded 5,255 new variants of malwares and 178 new families. However, the malwares dis-
closed only in December 2011 are more than over the entire 2004-2010 period. Recently,
Kaspersky Lap (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014) reported around 10 million malwares were
detected between 2012 and 2013.
Malware authors remain concentrating on Android OS, where 98.10% of all detected malwares
in 2013 targeted Android system (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014). This occured due to three
factors: (i) the popularity of Android, (ii) the vulnerability of its architecture, and (iii) the
fact Android gave application developers more facilities and freedom to release and upload
application to marketplaces. Figure 1.5 illustrates malwares for different smartphone systems.
Since the detection of the first Android malware in August 2010, Android malware develop-
ments have made great innovation in their capabilities, distribution and how to avoid detection.
Ginmaster is a torjan program disclosed in 2011 in China. This torjan is distributed through
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legitimate applications by injecting its malicious code. One year later, Ginmaster resists de-
tections by using obfuscating class names, encrypting URL and C& C instruction. In 2013,
the developers of Ginmaster used more complex and smarter obfuscation and encryption tech-
niques (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014).
Figure 1.5 Smartphone malwares distribution in 2013 by OS
Taken from (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014).
1.5.1 Malware classification
The classification of smartphone malwares does not differ than computer malwares. The clas-
sification depends on their characteristics. These characteristics can be identified by answering
precise questions such as:
• Is the malware stand-alone program or piece of code in a program?
• Is the malware self-replicating or non-replicating?
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• Does the malware hide the malicious function or hide itself?
One possible classification of malware (Chen and Peikari, 2008) is presented in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6 Smartphone malwares classification.
• A virus is a piece of software that attaches to an executable file, when the contaminated file
is executing the viral code gets executed. A virus can overwrite programs on the system,
destroy or delete data, use email to spread itself, or even erase everything on the memory.
Virus is spread when the file is copied or moved from one system to another using the
network, a disk, file sharing, or infected e-mail attachments (Chen and Peikari, 2008; cisco
security, 2011).
• A worm is a stand-alone malicious program. It is self-replicating program, and uses com-
munication channels to send copy of itself to other systems. Worm can delete files, encrypt
files, send junk email, and consume network bandwidth (Chen and Peikari, 2008; cisco se-
curity, 2011). The first smartphone malware was worm, Cabir, which propagated through
Bluetooth.
• A trojan horse is a program that presents itself as a legitimate program, while it actually
has malicious activities. Trojan horse stays hidden on the infected system and achieves any
types of attacks such as generating popping up windows, deleting files, stealing data, or
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activating and spreading other malware like viruse or bot. Trojan can open back door to
give malicious users access to the system. Trojan horse is not self-replicating. It spreads
by opening an email message attachment, copying files from storage media such as USB
key, or downloading and running a file from the Internet (Chen and Peikari, 2008; cisco
security, 2011). DroidKungFu is an example of Android Trojan that collects and transmits
confidential data to remote server (threat description, 2011).
• A spyware is a program installed on the user device without his knowledge. The main
tasks of spywares are: (i) monitoring user activities such as visited websites, received and
sent emails, and exchanged instant messages, and (ii) collecting private information, such
as usernames, passwords, account numbers, and even driver’s license or social security
numbers. The spyware transmits the collected information outside the infected system,
usually for advertising purposes. Spyware is generally installed from a "free" or trail
downloaded software. Some web sites will attempt to install spyware when you visit their
page (Chen and Peikari, 2008; cisco security, 2011). Nickispy is an Android spyware that
can records phone calls (Jiang, 2011).
• A botnet is a self-propagating malware that infects smartphone systems and connects back
to a server that acts as a command and control (C&C) center for an entire network of
compromised systems, or "botnet". A bot can register keystrokes, collect passwords and
financial data, capture and analyze packets, launch DOS attacks, and open back doors on
the infected device to provide unauthorized access to the device (cisco security, 2011).
• A trackware is a program that collects information that could be used to identify a user
or device to an application. For example, an application that provides device location
service (F-Secure, 2013).
• An Adware is any application in which advertisements are displayed during application
execution in order to generate revenue for its developer. Adware has an additional code
than benign application that displays the Ads. Unfortunately, some Adwares have intrusive
behavior, such as leakage user’s personal information or change system settings without
the user’s authorization (F-Secure, 2013).
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The detected malwares are distributed over their classes as shown Figure 1.7 (Chebyshev and Un-
uchek, 2014). Smartphone malwares are clearly developed to steal user’s money using SMS-
Trojans (33.50%), Backdoors (20.60 %) and Trojans (19.40%).
Figure 1.7 Smartphone malwares distribution by class.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Due to sharp increase of malwares targeting smartphone systems, smartphone malware de-
tection research field keeps attracting new researchers of different backgrounds. Smartphone
malware detection is a new field of research. However, the number of published papers in
this subject is constantly increasing and different approaches are proposed. The proposed ap-
proaches have been classified into different classes with different names such as: misuse tech-
niques, dynamic techniques, anomaly techniques, behavior techniques, static techniques and
signature-based techniques. Those classes are wide and general, where the same techniques are
referred to in different research papers with different class’s names. As far as we know, the lit-
erature has not proposed unified taxonomy with clear criteria to classify smartphone malwares
detection techniques. Fine-grained and structured classification of smartphone malware detec-
tion techniques can greatly assist new researchers in this field to review the related literature
easily, as well as where they should focus their research more on.
The aim of this chapter is to review the existing smartphone malware detection techniques and
provide a structured and comprehensive classification of those techniques according to well de-
fined and structured criteria. This classification should help us to understand the current trends
in smartphone malware detection techniques and identify their advantages and drawbacks, as
well as explore the possible future trends.
This study classifies smartphone malware detection techniques according to well defined crite-
ria. Those criteria are inferred and complied from the existing malware detection researches (Chan-
dola et al., 2009; Idika and Mathur, 2007; Jacob et al., 2008; Kabiri and Ghorbani, 2005;
La Polla et al., 2013; Vinod et al., 2009) and can be summarized as follow:
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• The reference behavior used by the malware detector to identify malicious and benign
applications. The reference behavior can be benign behavior or malicious behavior.
• The analysis techniques used to analyse behavior of applications. The analysis techniques
could be static or dynamic, and each technique extracts data that is used to represent appli-
cation behavior.
• The algorithm used to model application’s behavior.
• The data and information used to represent malicious behaviors.
According to these criteria, smartphone malware detection techniques could be classified into
different classes. For example, reference behavior classifies the techniques to signature-based
detection techniques that use malicious behaviors as reference behavior, and anomaly-based
detection techniques that use benign behaviors as reference behavior. Analysis techniques
classify the detection techniques to static or dynamic techniques. The malware detection tech-
niques classification and their criteria are described in more details in the next sections.
2.2 Malware detection techniques classification criteria
A malware detector is a system responsible to determine whether a program has malicious be-
havior. In other words, malware detectorD is defined as a function: D :P→{malware,benign}
where P is a set of programs installed on the smartphone system, for a given program p
D(p) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Malware if p contains malicious behavior,
Benign otherwise
(2.1)
Malware detectors use different algorithms, analysis techniques, data and approaches to detect
malicious intents. Broadly, malware detection techniques for smartphone systems are classified
into different categories according to well defined rules. These rules are inferred and compiled
from literature reviews of malware detection techniques in general and recent contributions tar-
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geting smartphone malwares detection (Chandola et al., 2009; Idika and Mathur, 2007; Jacob
et al., 2008; Kabiri and Ghorbani, 2005; La Polla et al., 2013; Vinod et al., 2009). Figure 2.1
gives a closer look to these rules and their possible categories.
Figure 2.1 Overview of malware detection techniques criteria.
2.2.1 Reference behavior rule
Malware detection techniques use reference behavior to distinguish malicious applications
from benign ones. This reference behavior can be malicious behavior, as in the case of
signature-based techniques (referenced as misuse techniques in some references) or benign be-
havior, as in the case anomaly-based techniques (Idika and Mathur, 2007; Vinod et al., 2009).
The difference between the two techniques is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Signature-based detec-
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tion techniques define every known malware by a signature or pattern. Then use the malware
signatures to identify an application’s behavior either malicious or benign. Anomaly-based de-
tection techniques model benign behavior as reference behavior. Then use this benign model
to identify an application’s behavior either malicious or benign.
Figure 2.2 Reference behavior rule.
2.2.2 Analysis techniques rule
Analysis techniques are the techniques that used to study and understand the application’s
behavior, as well as extract data that can represent this behavior. The two main analysis tech-
niques are: static analysis and dynamic analysis. Static analysis techniques study application’s
behavior from its code information without executing it. These techniques pass through dif-
ferent steps, such as unpacking, disassembling, analysing and extracting the data. Dynamic
analysis techniques study application’s behavior from its run-time information. These tech-
niques install and run the application, then collect information, such as events, system call
traces, and communication traffic. According to this rule, the malware detection techniques
can be classified into two categories: static techniques and dynamic techniques (Amamra et al.,
2012b).
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2.2.3 Algorithms rule
Various algorithms have been used for differentiating between malicious and benign applica-
tions, as well as improving the execution performance. Broadly, the most used algorithms
are: (i) machine learning classifiers (Shabtai et al., 2012; Amamra et al., 2012c,b), (ii) taint
analysis (Enck et al., 2014), (iii) control flow analysis (Grace et al., 2012), (iv) code inspec-
tion (Zhou et al., 2012) and (v) multi-pattern matching algorithms (Amamra et al., 2012a).
Malware detection techniques can be classified according to the used algorithms.
2.2.4 Dataset rule
Different data have been studied and used to represent application’s behavior. The used data is
an influential factor on the detection accuracy and execution performance of malware detection
techniques. The data can be extracted at the following levels: application, operating system
(OS) and hardware. Broadly, the most used ones at application level are: hexadecimal bytes,
hash values, and application code syntax and structural properties (Aafer et al., 2013). At
operating system level, run-time events and triggers such as system calls (Burguera et al.,
2011; Amamra et al., 2012c). Finally, at the hardware level, the used data are the basic system
metrics such as CPU usage, free or used memory and power consumption (Shabtai et al., 2012).
2.3 Malware detection techniques classification
Figure 2.3 illustrates one possible classification of malware detection techniques using the dif-
ferent defined rules that are presented in the last section. Reference behavior rule classifies
detection techniques broadly into two main categories: anomaly-based detection techniques
and signature-based detection techniques. Anomaly-based detection techniques build benign
behavior profile in training phase, and any deviation from this profile in detection phase is con-
sidered malicious. For each technique, a new rule can be used to split it into subcategories.
For example, analysis techniques rule can classify anomaly-based detection techniques into
static detection techniques or dynamic detection techniques. In static techniques, the program
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behavior is represented by static information such as, programs syntax, code instructions, APIs
and program structural properties. While dynamic detection techniques use the run-time infor-
mation that is collected from application’s execution, such as system calls.
The malware signatures could be static signatures or behavior signatures. Static signatures are
sequence of hexadecimal bytes or sequence of alphanumeric characters represents hash value.
While behavior signatures are complex meta-structures embracing dynamic concepts and a se-
mantic interpretation. Analysis techniques rule classifies behavior signature techniques into
static behavior signature and dynamic behavior signature. In static behavior signature, the sig-
nature is extracted from code syntax and structural information. In dynamic behavior signature,
the signature is extracted from code runtime information. Closer look to these techniques is
presented in the next sections.
Figure 2.3 Smartphone malwares detection techniques classification.
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2.4 Signature-based detection techniques
Signature-based detection techniques model the known malicious behavior of malware in form
of signature and use this signature in the detection process. All malware signatures are stored
in a repository. This repository represents malware signatures database and is searched when
the detector attempts to identify whether or not a program contains known malicious behavior.
To keep the malware detector accurate and efficient, the signature database must be updated
as soon as a new signature is available. Signature creation needs human expertise, which
introduces human error and considerable delay.
The malware signatures can be static signatures or behavior signatures. A static signatures
are a sequence of hexadecimal bytes or hash values. The behavior signatures represent mal-
ware behaviors. According to the malware behavior representation rule, signature-based de-
tection techniques are classified into static signature-based detection techniques and behavior
signature-based detection techniques.
2.4.1 Static signatures-based detection techniques
Static signatures are adopted by the most commercial Antivirus. Some of them are presented
in Table 2.1. Static signature-based detection techniques scan the phone RAM and SD card for
patterns that match with one of its signature database. The most common signatures used in
these techniques are byte-signatures and hash-signatures.
Table 2.1 Samples of commercial antivirus for smartphone.
Product License OS platform
Kaspersky Mobile Security Commercial Android, Symbian, Windows, Blackberry OS
Norton Mobile Security Commercial Android, Symbian, Windows, Blackberry OS
McAfee Mobile Security Commercial Android, Symbian, Windows, Blackberry OS
Lookout Mobile Security Free Android, iPhone OS
iCareMobile Free Android, Symbian
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2.4.1.1 Byte code signature
Byte code signature is sequence of hexadecimal bytes that are present in a file or data stream.
It is very known form of detection and has been used since the first Antivirus detector. For ex-
ample, the hexadecimal signature of the Chernobyl/CIH virus (Christodorescu and Jha, 2006)
is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 The hexadecimal signature of the Chernobyl/CIH
virus.
The signature illustrated in Figure 2.4 corresponds to part of the virus body, and the IA-32
instruction sequence corresponding to the signature is presented in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 IA-32 instruction sequence corresponding to the
Chernobyl/CIH virus.
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Figure 2.6 illustrates the byte code signature of the famous Android malware, DroidDream (Ras-
togi et al., 2013). The signature is given in smali (an intuitive assembly language for Dalvik
bytecode).
Figure 2.6 The byte code signature of DroidDream malware.
2.4.1.2 Hash signature
It is the most basic and easiest form of signature. Hash-signature is created by a hash function
that converts data into sequence of alpha-numeric characters. The most commonly used hash
functions are MD5 and SHA-1, where 84% of all signatures in ClamAV are MD5 (Cha et al.,
2011). For example, the MD5 hash values of two simple words are illustred in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7 The MD5 hash of similar words.
The main drawback of hash-signature is that the hash function generates a new hash value if a
byte changes in the same block. This leads to new signatures for the same malware. Table 2.2
presents some samples of famous Android malwares and their SHA-1 signature (Rastogi et al.,
2013).
Static signature-based detection techniques use multi-pattern matching algorithms (Commentz-
Walter, 1979; Aho and Corasick, 1975; Wu et al., 1994) to identify malicious instances. There-
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fore, optimising these algorithms helps malware detectors to run faster and consume less sys-
tem resources (Zhang et al., 2009; Van Lunteren et al., 2006; Amamra et al., 2012a).
Table 2.2 Samples of SHA-1 signatures of smartphone malwares.
Malware name Package name SHA-1 signature
DroidDream Com.droiddream.bowlingtime 72adcf43e5f945ca9f72 064b81dc0062007f0fbf
Geinimi Com.sgg.spp 1317d996682f4ae4cce6 0d90c43fe3e674f60c22
Fakeplayer Org.me.androidapplication1 1e993b0632d5bc6f0741 0ee31e41dd316435d997
Static signature-based detection techniques are very efficient and reliable to identify known
malwares. However, they cannot detect unknown malwares and variants of known malwares.
In addition, these techniques need human expertise intervention to develop signatures of new
malwares, which is time consuming. Also, they are easily evaded by using different obfuscation
techniques, such as binary packers, encryption, or self-modifying code, which means recycling
existence malwares with different signatures (Christodorescu and Jha, 2006; Idika and Mathur,
2007; Rastogi et al., 2013)
Static signature-based detection techniques are light in term of computational complexity.
Therefore, they are suitable to smartphone systems. They adopt on-device architecture where
the anti-malware is installed on the smartphone system. The main advantage of on-device
architecture is that it is independent to external server, which means there would not be any
server down problem and network congestion.
2.4.2 Behavior signature-based detection techniques
Behavior signatures are complex meta-structures embracing dynamic concepts and a semantic
interpretation. Behavior signature is more effective and efficient to deal with obfuscation tech-
niques, such as polymorphic, binary packers, and encryption. Analysis approach rule classifies
behavior signature into static behavior signature and dynamic behavior signature. In static be-
havior signature, the signature is extracted by analysing the malware code. In dynamic behavior
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signature, the signature is extracted from runtime information by executing and monitoring the
malware code (Amamra et al., 2012b).
2.4.2.1 Static behavior signature-based detection techniques
These techniques are based on static code analysis technique, which uses information em-
bedded in a given executable file or code templates to capture the functionality of a specific
malware family. Blasing et al. (2010) have presented Android Application SandBox frame-
work for malicious software detection. It performs static and dynamic analysis. The static
analysis runs on the device, decompresses the apk file, converts their class files into java source
code, searches for suspicious patterns and marks them as benign or malicious. Following a
“trial-and-error approach”, the authors defined the following malicious patterns: (i) usage of
the Java Native Interface, (ii) usage of Sytem.get and Runtime.exec(), (iii) usage of reflection,
(iv) usage of services and IPC provision, and (v) usage of Android Permissions.
The advantages of static behavior signature technique include: (1) it detects entire family of
malware variants with one signature, (2) it detects malware before execution and all execu-
tion paths are enumeratively available. However, the technique suffer from limitations, such
as (i) the features extraction is quite complex and requires several processing steps, (ii) it is
computationally expensive because of disassembling and scanning large files, and then applies
complicated classification algorithms. Therefore, static signature extraction requires much sys-
tem resources.
2.4.2.2 Dynamic behavior signature-based detection techniques
These techniques are based on features extracted from runtime behavior. Since the malware
execution shows the real malware intensions and activities, the dynamic signature behavior
representation is closer to the real behavior of malware.
Among published researches Dai et al. (2010) proposed a technique that uses API interception
techniques to dynamic analyse application’s behavior. They analysed application’s behavior
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compared to malware behavior signatures database. The malware behavior signature is a se-
quence of API function calls and is modelled by a Finite State Automaton (FSA). Push-Down
Automata (PDA) has been used to describe the code samples to be analysed. The technique
matches the malicious signature using model checking by computing the intersection of the
FSA and PDA. This technique is tested on HTC PPC6800 running Windows Mobile 6.0 OS
and compared with commercial Antivirus. While commercial anti-viruses can detect the virus
before packing, they could not do it when the virus is packed. The proposed technique can
detect those viruses before and after packing.
Bose et al. (2008) proposed a signature behavior detection approach. This approach is based on
modelling application behaviors using temporal logic of causal knowledge (TLCK). They spec-
ify the behavior of malware as collection of resource-access and events made by that malware.
The behavior monitor agent supervises the application behavior to construct on-line behavior
signatures from APIs calls. They used SVM machine learning classifier to detect malwares
from their partial or incomplete behavior signatures. The technique is tested on Symbian OS
phone and it identifies current mobile viruses and worms with more than 96% accuracy.
Kim et al. (2008) proposed a signature-based power-aware malware-detection framework. It
detects previously unknown energy depletion threats. The framework consists of a power moni-
tor agent and a data analyser agent. The power monitor agent supervises the smartphone system
and takes samples of power consumption, which are used to build a power consumption his-
tory. The data analyser receives the power consumption history from the monitor agent and its
main job is to extract a unique pattern from the history to identify power signature. This power
signature is then compared against the database of priori signatures. The data analyser uses two
data-processing software components: noise-filtering and data-compressing. The framework
was tested on an HP iPAQ running a Windows Mobile OS. It had high rate (up to 95%) storage-
saving without losing the detection accuracy and high true positive rate (99%) in classifying
malwares.
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The advantages of dynamic signature-based technique are: (i) the signature is generic, where
a single behavior signature detects not only one malware but a whole class of malwares, and
(ii) dynamic signature is more close to malware behavior and intensions. The limitations of
this technique are: (i) malicious behavior needs to be well analysed, (ii) dynamic behavior
signature must be accurate and compact as much as possible, and (iii) the behavior signature
cannot detect a new malware of a new behavior.
Dynamic signature-based technique generally adopts client-server architecture, where the ap-
plications are executed on smartphone system and their traces and events are sent to external
server to extract the behavior signature.
2.5 Anomaly-based detection techniques
Anomaly-based detection techniques are broadly classified into static techniques and dynamic
techniques. The static techniques use information embedded in a given executable file or code
templates to capture the functionality of the application. The dynamic techniques use the
events, traces, logs and information collected from the application’s execution. This Thesis
is mainly concerned with anomaly-based detection techniques on Android smartphone system.
2.5.1 Static anomaly-based detection techniques
The static techniques are performed without actually running the application. The analysis is
based on static information that is extracted from the application package files. The mainly
investigated static techniques in the prior work are: (i) modelling benign behavior profile us-
ing machine learning classifiers and static data, (ii) static dataflow analysis, (iii) control flow
analysis and (iv) byte code inspection. These techniques are explained in more details in the
coming of this subsection.
To understand the static techniques used for Android platform, we briefly review Android ap-
plication package structure and the contained information. Android application is packaged in
APK file. The APK file contains all the information necessary to install and run the application
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on the Android device or emulator (developer.android.com, 2014b). The components of an
APK file are illustrated in Figure 2.8, and these are:
• Assets folder contains documents that inform about the application such as FAQ and license
information.
• META-INF folder contains files such as CERT.RSA, the certificate of the application and
CERT.SF to ensure the integrity of the APK package.
• Res folder holds resource files, such as videos and sounds.
• AndroidManifast.xml file presents important information about the application, such as the
access permission, the API version and the references to library files. These information
are essential to the Android system before it can run the application code.
• Classes.dex is Dalvik virtual machine executable byte code.
• Resources.arcs is binary resource file after compilation.
Figure 2.8 The component of apk package
To extract features and information from an APK package, various reverse engineering steps
are used, as shown in Figure 2.9. APK package can be decompressed by any archive tool,
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such as winzip into separate files and folders. The most used files in static analysis are the
Androidmanifest.xml file and the classe.dex file. Androidmanifest.xml file is recovered into
readable form using different reverse engineering tools, such as apktool. Various analyses are
then applied to extract important information, such as requested permission. This information
is then used to distinguish benign applications from malicious ones.
The classe.dex file is the byte code of the application. This file is disassembled into one of the
two readable forms: into smali by using apktool, or into java by using dex2jar tool. After that,
information mining and analysis are applied to extract features and data that can be used to
detect malicious behavior.
In general, static techniques can be divided into two categories. First, train and test machine
learning classifiers by static data, such as requested permissions and API. Second, using tradi-
tional code analysis. These techniques are reviewed in details in the next parts.
2.5.1.1 Machine learning classifier
Machine learning classifiers have been widely used in malware detection techniques. They are
usually used to predict application’s behaviors. Classifiers predict unknown instances as either
benign or malicious. This process consists of two phases: training and testing. In the first
phase (Figure 2.10 (a)), a training data of benign and/or malicious samples is provided to the
classifier. By processing the training data, the classifier determines their parameters. In the
testing phase (Figure 2.10 (b)), new benign and/or malicious samples that did not appear in the
training samples set are provided to the classifier to evaluate its performance (Shabtai et al.,
2009b).
In prior work, different classifiers are implemented and tested and various data are used to
represent behavior of apllications. The main investigated static data are: requested permissions,
features and APIs.
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Figure 2.9 Overview of static techniques steps
• The requested permission : Android application cannot access most system resources,
such as camera functions, network connections, telephony capabilities, SMS/MMS func-
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Figure 2.10 Machine learning classifiers steps
Taken from (Shabtai et al., 2009b)
tions and reading or writing user’s private information as well as other application files. In
order to access these resources, Android application should declare the permissions it needs
in the AndroidManifest.xml file using<uses-permission> tag (developer.android.com, 2014a)
as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Android 2.3 has 134 permissions (Bartel et al., 2014).
Among published papers Sahs and Khan (2012) extracted list of the requested permis-
sions from the AndroidManifest.xml file, and they generated a binary vector where each
entry corresponds to a built-in permission which is set to 1 if the application requests that
permission, and to 0 otherwise. They train a one-class support vector machine (SVM) clas-
sifier only with benign applications because they have far more benign applications than
malicious ones. The experiments have shown promising results.
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Aung and Zaw (2013) used the same data vector as (Sahs et Khan, 2012) with different
machine learning classifiers. They applied k-means as first stage on training data, which
contains benign and malware samples to obtain k disjoint clusters. In the second stage,
they applied decision tree on the k clusters. The classifiers are evaluated by true positive
rate, false positive rate and the overall accuracy. The experiment results show very good
accuracy results.
Sanz et al. (2013) have examined the SVM, decision tree, k-nearest-neighbors, Bayesian
network and random forest classifiers on the following dataset: requested permission, fea-
tures and the combination (requested permissions + features). To measure the accuracy
performance of the classifiers, they used four metrics: true positive rate, false positive rate,
accuracy and area under the ROC curve (AUC). The experiment results good accuracy re-
sults for all classifiers. The classifiers are more accurate when using combination dataset.
Random forest classifier has the better accuracy performance.
Figure 2.11 Permission request in Androidmanifest.XML file
• Features: if an application requires to access a hardware or a software feature, it must de-
clare that feature with a <use-feature> element in the Androidmanifest.xml file . Sanz et al.
(2013) reported that the number of permissions required by benign and malicious applica-
tions are equal. Therefore, they conclude that the number of permissions does not seem to
be accurately determining whether an application is a benign or not. They consider the fea-
tures tag to add complementery information to permissions and provide closer behavioral
view of the inspected application. They examined the combination of requested permission
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and features tags on five different classifiers: k-nearest neighbours, decision tree, Bayesian
network, random forest and support vector machine. The results showed that combination
gives better performance than using requested permission or feature tags alone.
• API (Application Program Interface) : it is a set of functions and tools for developing ap-
plications. Android provides rich framework API that allows developers to create powerful
applications with innovative user interface and reliable access to real hardware. However,
some sensitive functions are restricted by an intentional lack of API, such as APIs to ma-
nipulate SIM card. Other sensitive functionalities should be used by trusted applications
and should be protected by permissions, such as camera functions, telephony functions and
network functions (source.android.com, 2014). Some of these sensitive APIs are illustrated
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Sample of sensirive APIs.
API Function
Camera.shutterCallbeck Used to signal the moment of actual image
capture
Camera.ErrorCallback Camera error notification
Camera.PictureCallback Used to supply image data from a photo cap-
ture
DisplayManager.DisplayListener Listens for changes in available display de-
vices
InputManager.InputDeviceListener Listens for changes in input devices
LocationListener Used to receive notification from Location
Manager when the location has changed
GpsStatus.NmeaListener Used for receiving NMEA sentences from the
GPS
API calls are used by different researchers to detect malwares. Aafer et al. (2013) rely
on API calls information within the bytecode. They statically analyzed a large number
of malicious and benign applications and produced a list of distinct API calls within each
category. A distinct API refers to a distinct combination of Class Name, Method Name,
and Descriptor. They, then, conducted a frequency analysis to select those APIs which
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were more used in the malicious than in the benign set. They evaluated different standard
classifiers: decision tree, k-nearest neighbours and support vector machine on API feature
set and permission feature set. The classifier performance is measured by true positive
ratio, true negative ratio and the overall accuracy. The experiment results show the APIs
dataset has better performance than permissions dataset, and the KNN classifier has the
best accuracy performance.
Peiravian and Zhu (2013) evaluated support vector machine, decision tree and bagging
classifiers using the requested permissions, API calls and their combination. The dataset
was extracted from 610 malicious applications and 1250 benign applications. Combing
permissions and API calls had better classification performance because it provided addi-
tional information in characterizing the behavior of applications. The bagging classifier
outperformed the other classifiers due to its capabilities to overcome imbalanced dataset.
Finally, Arp et al. (2014) presented DREBIN, a lightweight framework for Android mal-
ware detection. DREBIN performs static analysis on APK package to extract various static
information. They focused on Androidmanifest.xml file and disassembled dex bytecode.
The features extracted from Androidmanifest.xml file are: hardware components, requested
permission, application component and filtered intents. The features extracted from disas-
sembled bytecode were: restricted API calls, used permissions, suspicious API calls and
network addresses. The dataset contained 123453 benign applications and 5560 malicious
application. They used linear support vector machine classifier. DREBIN had a very good
performance with high malware detection rate and low false positive rate.
2.5.1.2 Code analysis
Code analysis is the process of inspecting the application bytecode to understand the applica-
tion’s behavior. The code analysis mainly used in: checking for code errors, code improvement
and optimization and security flaws. There are various static code analyses techniques used to
detect anomalous behavior for Android applications. The main used ones are: control flow
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graph, data flow and bytecode instruction analysis. These techniques are explained in more
details in the next paragraphs.
• Control flow graph (CFG): CFG is an abstract representation of a program using graph
notation. The nodes in the graph represent basic blocks, i.e., a sequence of consecutive
instructions without any branching in or out in the middle of the instruction. The edges are
used to represent the possible control flow from end of one block to the beginning of the
other. Figure 2.12 illustrates simple CFG of simple code.
Figure 2.12 Control flow graph of simple code
CFG is mainly used in compiler optimization and static code analysis. However, its uses
in the security bugs, vulnerability and anomaly detection keep increasing. Among the
published researches Sahs and Khan (2012) extract CFG for each method from its raw
bytecode. They, then, combine methods graphs into a large disconnected graph. Chin et al.
(2011) developed ComDroid tool to detect potential vulnerabilities in Android applications.
The tool uses control flow analysis to identify unauthorized Intent receipt attacks. Grace
et al. (2012) propose Woodpecker, based on control flow to detect capability leaks in stock
Android smartphone systems. They built CFG for each entry point. The whole applica-
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tion CFG was the union of all the entry points CFGs. They used the CFG and the entry
points to locate possible execution paths and find the unprotected ones. Finally, Gibler
et al. (2012) proposed a static analysis framework, AndroidLeaks, to identify any leaks of
personal information by constructing the call graph of the application code.
• Data flow: it is the tracking of data flows through and across application components.
Dataflow analysis are generally used to detect private information leakage. Among the
published research, Aafer et al. (2013) use data flow analysis on specific code class on par-
allel with APIs frequency to increase the discrimination property of the proposed detection
technique.
Fuchs et al. (2009) developed a tool named, ScanDroid. Basically, this tool statically tracks
data flows for Android application. ScanDroid extracts security specifications from An-
droiManifest.xml file of the application, and verifies whether or not the data flows through
the application code are consistent with those specifications.
Arzt et al. (2014) proposed FlowDroid tool. FlowDroid parse different Android application
files, including the dex class file, the layout xml files and the Androidmanifest.xml file
defining the application component (activities, services, broadcast receivers and content) to
retrieve lifecycle, callback methods and calls to sources and sinks in the application. After
that, the main method is generated from the previous elements. This main method is used
to construct call graph and inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG). The taint analysis
tracks taints by traversing ICFG.
• Bytecode instruction: each Android application package consists of classes.dex file. This
file contains the actual Dalvik bytecode for execution. Dalvik disassemblers such as baks-
mali are used to disassemble classes.dex file. Among the published research, Zhou et al.
(2012) used bytecode information to identify repackaging applications. Repackaged appli-
cations are mainly used to insert malicious code. They developed DroidMOSS tool that
measures the similarity between two applications. Each application is presented by a fin-
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gerprint. The fingerprint is generated by applying fuzzy hashing technique on application
bytecode and developer’s certificate.
Enck et al. (2011) statically analysed 1,100 popular free Android applications from An-
droid Market (official Android applications Market). They implemented a Dalvik decom-
piler ded, which recovered Android application source code. Twenty-one million lines
of code retrieved from 1,100 free applications were then analysed for exploring coding
security failures, identifying misuse security information and uncovering vulnerabilities.
They used four techniques to evaluate the code: control flow analysis, data flow analysis,
structural analysis, and semantic analysis. The analysis results showed that besides an over-
whelming concern for misuse of private and sensitive information such as phone number,
IMEI and IMSI and ICC-ID, about 51% of the applications used unexpected number of
Ads and analytics libraries. Also, it showed that many application developers did not fol-
low necessary security precautions and guidelines. For example, sensitive data were often
written to Android’s centralized logs.
The main advantage of using static data is its ability to detect the malwares before the execu-
tion. However, the static features suffer from some limitations: the permissions declared in the
Android manifest file do not necessarily mean that they are actually used within the code. Felt
et al. (2011) reported that a large number of Android applications were over-privileged. Mali-
cious behavior can be performed without any permission (Grace et al., 2012). Frequent APIs is
not an accurate discriminator between the malicious and the benign applications (Aafer et al.,
2013). Data flow, control flow and bytecode are quite complex and require several reverse en-
gineering processing steps, and it is computationally expensive because of the disassembling
and scanning big files.
2.5.2 Dynamic analysis
Dynamic techniques refer to the techniques that derive the behavior of an application while
it is executed. These techniques can monitor different features of application execution, such
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as API calls, system calls and system resources. The application execution shows the real
intensions and activities of the application. Therefore, the dynamic features should be closer
to the real application behavior. The dynamic features are presented at different levels of
application execution, as illustrated in Figure 2.13. At application level, dynamic features such
as API calls can be intercepted. System calls represent features at kernel level. At hardware
level, features about device hardware such as CPU memory can be extracted. For a reliable and
efficient dynamic analysis, safe and reliable environment for running and analysing application
is required. The two main used dynamic techniques are: machine learning classifiers and
dynamic taint analysis.
Figure 2.13 Basic levels of dynamic approaches
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2.5.2.1 Machine learning classifier
Section 2.5.1.1 explained the main used static data to train and test machine learning classifiers
for detecting anomaly. This section explains the main dynamic data that are used for the same
purpose. Various data are investigated, such as system calls and system metrics.
• System metrics: these metrics measure system stability. The system has relatively stable
performance and state when it is not under an attack. Once the system is infected by mal-
ware, the system shows abnormal behavior, such as slowness, excessive network commu-
nications and battery drain. Therefore, the system metrics are useful for malware detection.
Broadly, Table 2.4 presents the most used metrics. The system continuously monitors its
performance and extracts the representative parameters; it then applies machine learning
classifiers to classify them as benign or malicious. Features extraction complexity varies
from one feature to another. For example RAM_free feature can be easily extracted using
ActivityManager.getMemoryInfo() API. However, there are no APIs to read Process_count
and CPU_usage features. Therefore, the extraction process of these features is more com-
plex and needs algorithm to calculate the values.
Table 2.4 Samples of system metrics.
Feature Description
CPU_usage The usage of CPU
RAM_Free The available memory
Battery_consumption The consumption level of battery
Process_count The number of running processes
Install_app The number of installed apps
SMS_out The number of SMS sent
MMS_out The number of MMS sent
Call_in The number of incoming calls
Call_out The number of outgoing calls
WiFi_traffic The WiFi network traffic
Among the published research based on system metrics, Schmidt et al. (2009) proposed a
framework to monitor smartphone system running Symbian OS and Windows mobile OS
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in order to extract system features used in the process of detecting anomaly applications.
The proposed framework is based on monitoring client, which runs on the smartphone
system, collects the data describing the system state, such as the amount of free RAM,
the number of running processes, CPU usage, and the number of SMS messages in the
sent directory, and sends them to Remote Anomaly Detection System (RADS). The remote
server contains a database to store the received features. The detection unit accesses the
database and runs machine learning algorithms, e.g. AIS or SOM to distinguish between
benign and abnormal behaviors. A meta detection unit weighs the detection results of
different algorithms. The algorithms were executed on four features sets of different sizes,
reducing the set of features from 70 to 14 features, and thus, saving 80% of disk space and
significantly reducing computation and communication cost. Consequently, the approach
had a positive influence on the battery life and a small impact on true positive detection.
Shabtai et al. (2012) used various system metrics, such as CPU consumption, number of
sent packets through WiFi, number of running process and battery level to evaluate and
compare the performance of the following machine learning classifiers: k-means, logistics
regression, histograms, decision tree, bayesian networks and naïve bayes. Author per-
formed four experiments using 40 benign applications (20 games and 20 tools), and 4
proof-of-concept malicious applications with different objectives. Experiment 1 and Ex-
periment 3 evaluated the ability of classifiers to differentiate between malicious and benign
applications when the testing dataset is included in the training dataset. However, in ex-
periment 1, the training and testing processes were performed on the same device, while in
experiment 3 they were performed in two different devices. Experiment 2 and experiment
4 evaluated the ability of classifiers to differentiate between malicious and benign applica-
tions when the testing dataset was not included in the training dataset. In experiment 1, the
training and testing processes were performed on the same device, while in experiment 4,
they were performed in two different devices.
Yuan et al. (2013) proposed a malwares detection framework for Android system. The
framework consists of these components: data extraction module, data analysis engine and
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response module. The data extraction module monitors the system activities and extracts
the following features: CPU usage, battery consumption, memory usage, the amount of
running processes, the amount of running thread, installed application, the inflow of net-
work traffic, the outflow of network traffic, the amount of sent SMS and the amount of
sent MMS. Data analysis engine analyzes the extracted data by naïve bayes classifier for
determining if there is any anomalous behavior. Based on the analysis results, the response
module takes the appropriate action on Android smartphone system. The used dataset con-
sists of 45 benign applications and 15 malicious applications. The results of experiments
showed good detection rate.
• Power consumption: the relationship between power consumption and malware detection
comes from the idea that malicious applications use system resources more than benign
applications, especially communication channels, such as Bluetooth, WiFi and 3G tech-
nologies. Therefore, system under attack and benign system should have different power
behavior.
Among the published papers, Buennemeyer et al. (2008) proposed B-SIPS (Battery-Sensing
Intrusion detection Protection System) that uses battery constraints to detect malware ac-
tivities. B-SIPS monitors the smartphone system power consumption with two commu-
nication channels Bluetooth and WiFi. The anomalous activity is detected if the power
consumption level exceeds the system’s dynamic threshold value. B-SIPS alerts the user
and sends a report to the CIDE server. The Correlation Intrusion Detection Engine (CIDE)
server receives data from the smartphone system and creates a profile to track the battery
power and the number of running processes while the smartphone system is not under at-
tack. The average and standard deviation are computed for each system and an alert to
SA is generated if the system reports a value that is higher than the average and standard
deviation. B-SIPS has low positive rate because of Dynamic Threshold Calculation (DTC)
algorithm used to calculate the power consumption value dynamically.
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• System calls: Linux system calls are the interface between user applications and the kernel
services, as illustrated in Figure 2.14. System calls provide functions to user applications,
such as file operations (open, read, write, etc.), network operations (connect, send, receive,
etc), or process operations (create a new process, kill process, etc). System calls tarce
provide useful information about application behavior. Therefore, it is used in the field of
anomaly detection.
Figure 2.14 System call interface block diagram
Among the published papers, Burguera et al. (2011) proposed a solution based on Linux
system calls. This solution contains several components. Crowdroid is a lightweight pro-
gram that is executed on the system to collect system calls and send them to a remote server.
In the remote server, the system calls data is analyzed and feature vector is created for every
application. To differentiate between malicious and benign applications k-means algorithm
is applied. The solution is tested by 50 benign applications and 10 malicious applications
and show good performance.
Lin et al. (2013) propose SCSdroid framework to detect Android malware using sequence
of system calls. SCSdroid uses thread-gained system call sequences instead of process-
gained system call sequences. Thread-gained system calls means that the system calls
produced by the process and its threads are recorded separately. SCSdroid adopts Bayes
Theorem to distinguish between malware and benign applications. It is evaluated by a
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dataset that consists of 25 malicious applications and 100 benign applications, and it shows
good accuracy performance.
2.5.2.2 Dynamic taint analysis
Taint analysis techniques (Lokhande and Dhavale, 2014; Newsome and Song, 2005) refer to
tracking the information flow through an application and possible leakage. Taint analysis is
widely used in the security applications, such as unknown vulnerability detection, malware
analysis and track flow of sensitive information. In the taint analysis, the sources and sinks
of sensitive information are predefined. Taint sources are the sources of sensitive information,
such as accounts, emails, address book, calendar, personal database or files, phone state, SM-
S/MMS messages and Unique identifiers (IMEI). Whereas taint sinks are the destinations from
where data can leak out of the system, such as internet transmission, SMS/MMS transmission,
publicly accessible storage and inter-process communication message. Taint analysis identifies
whether there are routes from sources to sinks. If sensitive data can reach a sink, it is identified
as instances of data leakage. An overview of dynamic taint analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15 Overview of dynamic taint analysis
Among the published papers, Enck et al. (2014) proposed TaintDroid, a real-time system tracks
privacy-sensitive data flow. TaintDroid monitors how a third-party applications access and
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manipulate private information. The user is warned when monitored information leaves the
device. TaintDroid has the ability to track multiple sources and sinks simultaneously. It auto-
matically taints data from sources and transitively applies labels as sensitive data propagates
through program variables, files, and inter-process messages. When monitored data are leaked
over the internet, SMS messages, Bluetooth or any other means, TaintDroid logs the data’s
labels, the application responsible for transmitting the data, and the data’s destination. Such
log helps security administrator to understand how the application handle sensitive data, and
can potentially identify the applications of misusing these information.
TaintDroid evaluated on 30 popular Android applications that use location, camera, or micro-
phone data. TaintDroid discovered that two-thirds of the examined applications used sensitive
data suspiciously. Fifteen of the 30 applications reported users’ locations to remote advertising
servers and 7 applications gather the phone sensitive information: the device ID, the phone
number and the SIM card serial number.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed smartphone malware detection techniques. We have attempted
to compile and analyse common features and functionalities of detection techniques, and in-
fer classification criteria. According to these criteria, we have provided structured and com-
prehensive malware detection techniques taxonomy. Techniques used for detecting malwares
for smartphone systems are classified broadly into: signature-based detection techniques and
anomaly-based detection techniques. This classification relies on reference behavior used by
detection technique. Inside these categories, ramifications are then deduced according to anal-
ysis approaches, algorithms, and the used dataset.
Dynamic analysis is simpler than static analysis. It requires only isolated environment to install
and execute the applications. Android SDK tool is a tool to develop Android applications and
provides isolated Android system virtual machine, which can be used in dynamic analysis.
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System call trace is simple to obtain and it does not need any application knowledge or instru-
mentation. System call trace is obtained by running simple Linux commandstrace. System
call trace describes the application interactions with system. Therefore, it is representative of
application behavior.
The most proposed techniques inherited from the known malware detection techniques used in
computers and network where there are enough resources (enough memory space and powerful
processors). The main challenge facing this research area is innovative techniques respecting
smartphone resources and assures high detection accuracy and low false positive rate.

CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM CALLS AND FILTERING & ABSTRACTION PROCESS
3.1 Linux system calls
Linux kernel is the lowest layer of the Android architecture. Linux system calls are the in-
terface between user applications and the kernel services. System calls provide functions to
user applications, such as file operations (open, read, write, etc.), network operations (connect,
send, receive, etc.), or process operations (create a new process, kill process, etc.). As illus-
trated in Figure 3.1, when a user application requires a service from the operating system, the
request goes through the glibc library, the system call interface, the kernel and, finally, to the
hardware. The glibc library interprets the requests and the CPU switches from user mode to
kernel mode and executes the appropriate kernel function looking into the system call table.
Afterwards the user application gets the information requested in the user space in an inverse
process. Functions like getpid(), open(), read() and socket() are some of the functions that glibc
can provide applications to invoke a system call (Burguera et al., 2011).
Intercepting and analyzing the system calls provide useful information about the behavior of
an application. Several researchers (Burguera et al., 2011; Amamra et al., 2012c, 2013) used
system calls for anomaly detection for various reasons such as:
• System call traces collected from the executions give the basic operations of an application
like creating or ending a process, opening or closing a file and making a network connec-
tion. This makes system call traces closer to the real intentions of the application.
• The analysis of system call traces looks at the application as a black box. It does not need
any specialized knowledge of the application. System call traces can be obtained without
the instrumentation of the binary code or its recompilation.
• System call traces are simple and represent good discriminators for several types of mal-
ware.
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Figure 3.1 Linux system call execution
For the aforementioned reasons, our proposed solution is based on system call traces. However,
the system call traces need more investigation and improvement to overcome the limitations
mentioned in section 3.2.
This chapter presents our contribution on dataset level and it is twofold:
• The filtering and abstraction process is introduced to refine and simplify system call traces.
This process is explained in details in section 3.3 and its performance is evaluated in Chap-
ter 4 and Chapter 5.
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• The feature vector representation is investigated to compact the dataset and enhance the
accuracy performance of the classifier. This process is explained in details in section 3.4
and it is evaluated in section 3.4.4.
3.2 Limitation of using system calls
Anomaly-based detection systems based on system call traces still suffer from important lim-
itations affecting their performance and adaptability. These limitations are summarized in the
following subsections.
3.2.1 Easy evasion
Anomaly-based detection techniques based on system call traces can be evaded easily by in-
serting no-ops or nullified system calls, or replacing system calls with other system calls having
the same functionality but different names (Wagner and Soto, 2002).
• Inserting no-ops system calls: malicious sequences can be altered by inserting no-ops sys-
tem calls. For example, Figure 3.2 (a) illustrates an harmful sequence of four system calls
and any malware detection system should identify this sequence. This sequence can be eas-
ily altered by inserting system calls having no effect like system calls returning information
about process or file status, or returning time or clock status as presented in Figure 3.2 (b).
Similarly, system calls doomed to failure can be used (e.g., opening non-existing files as
presented in Figure 3.2 (c)).
• Replacing system call with aliases: malicious sequences can be altered by replacing system
calls by system calls having the same functionality but different names. For example,
pread(int fd, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) can easily replace read(int fd, void buf,
size_t count) except that pread reads the file with a given offset.
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Figure 3.2 Evasion techniques using no-ops system calls to hide
malicious sequences
3.2.2 Complex application behavior
System call traces contain several system calls irrelevant to describe the main behavior of an ap-
plication, such as system calls saving and maintaining process information, system calls check-
ing resources availability and managing resources, inter-process communication, and memory
management. These irrelevant system calls produce large and complex traces which may lead
to inaccurate models of the application behavior.
3.2.3 Time and space complexities
To build accurate benign behavior models, anomaly-based detection techniques are usually
based on machine learning and statistical approaches, such as support vector machine (SVM),
hidden markov model (HMM), Bayes model and k-means. However, these approaches have
two main limitations. First, their space and computational costs are generally expensive on
large size of system call traces. In some cases, the algorithms require multiple passes over the
entire datasets, thus violating the real-time aspect of an anomaly detection system. Second,
most of statistical approaches assume the benign behavior does not change while the system is
being trained and tested. This latter limitation violates the adaptability principle (Forrest et al.,
2008). Finally, the number of system calls keeps increasing from one OS kernel version to
another and this impact the adaptability and complexity of the approach.
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To overcome these limitations we propose a new process which filters and uses system call
abstraction to simplify and reduce the size of system call traces. Moreover, the refined traces
should be closer to the applications main behavior.
3.3 System calls filtering and abstraction process
The system call traces generated by applications correspond to low-level events. These traces
represent the interactions between the application and the kernel, such as information mainte-
nance, memory management, inter-processes communications, and hardware interrupts, etc.
Filtering and abstraction is the process of refining system call traces according to well defined
rules and producing compact and more discriminative system call traces. Once the size of the
traces has been reduced, the anomaly detection techniques would consume lesser computa-
tional resources and improve their detection accuracy (Amamra et al., 2014).
Figure 3.3 Overview of filtering and abstraction process
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Figure 3.3 presents the filtering and abstraction process principle where the input is a raw
system call trace and the output is the corresponding refined trace. The raw trace consists of all
the system calls generated by the execution of the application, such as memory management
(mmap2), get information system calls (gettid), etc, while the refined trace consists of only
the system calls describe the application main behavior. This process consists of two phases:
filtering phase that ignores all system calls irrelevant to describe the main application behavior
and abstraction phase that unifies system calls having similar and/or overlapping functions.
3.3.1 Filtering phase
Filtering is the process of removing the system calls that are useless to characterize the main
behavior of applications. For this purpose, we have studied Linux system call functions and
categories. Linux system calls can be roughly grouped into six categories according to their
functionality as in the succeeding text:
• File management: create and delete files, open and close files, read and write files, and get
and/or set files status and attributes.
• Process management: create and terminate process, load or execute process, get or set
process attributes, and wait event or signal.
• Memory management: allocate or free memory, and share or map memory and/or virtual
memory operations.
• Inter-process communication(IPC): exchange data among processes.
• Network communication: make or delete communication connections, send and receive
messages, get status information, and attach or detach remote devices.
• System wide: privileged and unprivileged file system, module management, and privileged
miscellaneous.
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From the aforementioned categories, we infer which system calls are irrelevant to describe the
main behavior of Android applications. These system calls are grouped in the following four
classes: inter-process communication, memory management, information maintenance system
calls and unsuccessful system calls.
3.3.1.1 Inter-Process Communication
For security and safety purposes, each Android application runs in an isolated virtual machine.
Thus, an application cannot manipulate directly the data of another application. However, in
many cases, the data exchanges between applications are necessary. Android is based on an
enhanced version of Linux containing a kernel module called Binder for inter-process com-
munications. All Binder transactions happen through the ioctl system call (Hsieh et al., 2013;
Guojun et al., 2012; Schreiber et al., 2011). Thus, all the standard Linux inter-process com-
munication (IPC) mechanisms can be ignored: pipes, message queues, semaphores, and shared
memory. Table 3.1 summarizes the standard Linux inter-process communication mechanisms.
Table 3.1 IPC system calls.
IPC mechanism System calls Nb. of system
calls
Pipe pipe, pipe2 2
Message Queue msgctl, msgget, msgsnd, msgrcv,
mq_getsetattr, mq_notify, mq_open,
mq_timereceive, mq_timesend, mq_-
unlink
10
Shared Memory shmctl, shmat, shmdt, shmget 4
Semaphore semctl, semget, semopl, semtimedop 4
3.3.1.2 Memory management
The malloc C-function is usually implemented by brk and/or mmap system calls. The brk sys-
tem call grabs a large chunk of memory and then split it as needed to get smaller chunks for
the malloc C-function. The brk system call can change the size of the heap. The mmap system
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call is used when very large memory space is allocated. Calling mmap reduces the negative ef-
fects of memory fragmentation. As such, not all the implementations of the malloc C-function
execute the same system call sequences. Two applications with the same behavior may have
very different memory management system call sequences (Wang et al., 2009; Waseem, 2010).
Thereby, we can ignore these calls because they do not characterise the application main be-
havior. Table 3.2 presents the memory management system calls.
Table 3.2 Memory management system calls.
Memory mechanism System calls Nb. of system
calls
Memory Management mmap, mmap2, munmap,
mremap, mlock, munlock, mlock-
all, munlochkall, set_mempolicy, brk,
sbrk, mprotect, modify_ldt
13
3.3.1.3 Information maintenance system calls
Many system calls do not add any valuable information to describe the application behaviors.
They exist simply for the purpose of transferring information between an application and the
operating system. For example, system calls returning the current time and date (e.g., time,
gettimeofday), system calls returning information about the system such as available or free
system resources (e.g., getcpu, getrlimit), system calls returning file status (e.g., state, fstatfs,
getxattr, listxattr). Also, system calls returning process information such as the user id and
group id of the process (e.g., getuid, getgid), and system calls synchronizing the process (e.g.,
wait, epoll_wait) (Silberschatz et al., 2012). Therefore, these system calls can be ignored.
Table 3.3 illustrates the different classes of information maintenance system calls.
3.3.1.4 Unsuccessful system calls
Unsuccessful system calls do not have any impact on the application behaviors. For example,
if an application fails to open a file in the first two attempts and succeeds in the third one,
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Table 3.3 Information maintenance system calls.
Class System calls examples Nb. of system
calls
File Management mmap, mmap2, munmap,
mremap, mlock, munlock, mlock-
all, munlochkall, set_mempolicy, brk,
sbrk, mprotect, modify_ldt,...
39
Process Management getpriority, wait, poll, select, epoll_-
wait, getuid, getgid, getgroups,...
55
Communication getsockopt, getsockname, gethost-
name, gethostid, getpeername, ...
6
Miscellaneous futex, clock_gettime, clock_-
nanosleep, getcpu, getpagesize,
olduname, gettimeofday, ...
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the open system call is used three times. In such a case, the first two open calls should be
ignored (Wang et al., 2009).
3.3.2 Abstraction phase
There are many system calls having the similar and overlapping functionalities but different
names. For example, the readv(int fd, const struct iovec, int iovcnt) system call has almost
the same function as read(int fd, void buf, size_t count). The only difference lies on the fact
that the former call fills multiple buffers instead of only one. An example of overlapping
functionalities, the open system calls can be used to open new files or existing files while the
create system call can be used only to open new files. Hence, the abstraction process considers
system calls of the similar and overlapping functionalities as equivalent. This process does
not only simplify the traces and reduce the required resources to analyse them, but also protect
against attacks where an attacker replaces system call with equivalent ones (Wang et al., 2009).
Table 3.4 illustrates some system calls abstraction.
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Table 3.4 System calls aliases examples.
System call Alias
open open, openat, create, dup
read read, readv, pread, readlink, readlinkat
write write, writev, pwrite
recv recv, recvfrom, recvmsg
send send, sendto, sendmsg, sendmmsg
rename rename, renameat
exec exec, execve
3.3.3 End result
We examine Android OS version 2.3 based on Linux kernel version 2.6. This version has 317
different system calls (Inoue and Somayaji, 2007). The filtering process reduces the number
of system calls by 169 and the abstraction process reduces the number by another 23. Hence,
the refined traces would be composed of at most 125 different system calls. Table 3.5 illus-
trates some examples of application traces and their potential reduction after the filtering and
abstraction process.
Table 3.5 Impact of the filtering and abstraction
process on the size of application traces.
Application name Nb. of system calls
of raw trace
Nb. of system calls
of refined trace
Improvement
Play music 18008 3373 81,26%
Firefox 7324 1360 91,43%
Calculator 42143 13477 68%
Meteo media 170177 41929 75.36%
Solitaire game 41244 16548 70%
Sodoku game 91783 8777 90.40%
3.4 System call feature vectors
To improve the performance of anomaly-based detection techniques, prior works explored
actively two factors: dataset (size and type) such as, requested permission (Aung and Zaw,
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2013), API (Aafer et al., 2013) and system calls (Amamra et al., 2013); and the algorithm used
to model the benign behavior profile such as, k-means (Burguera et al., 2011), SVM (Bose
et al., 2008) and hybrid classifier (Amamra et al., 2012c). Increasing the quantity of dataset
or varying the type of used dataset to characterize benign behavior improves the accuracy of
the benign behavior profile. However, the resulting profile has usually high computational and
space overhead. Therefore, these factors are not suitable to improve performance of anomaly-
based detection techniques on limited resources environment, such as smartphone systems.
Thereby, exploring other factors that have significant influence on the performance of anomaly-
based techniques as well as low computational and space complexities is an important step for
anomaly detection techniques in smartphone systems. In this section, we highlight the dataset
feature vector representation as a new factor.
Roughly speaking, a system call trace is a chunk of information. That information is formatted
and organized in a dataset D as shown in Figure 3.4. The dataset D has a specific format that
expresses how the data is organized. This format is called dataset representation or feature
vector, and it is used during training as well as detection phases of machine learning classifiers.
The process of preparing dataset feature vector representation has light computational and
space complexity which makes it a suitable approach toward smartphone malwares detection
technique.
In general, there are three feature vector representations. These representations are studied and
compared in (Amamra et al., 2013). Briefly, these representations are:
• Successive system calls representation, where the ordering information between system
calls is considered in sequence. This dataset representation is used in prior work.
• Bag of system calls representation, where the successiveness of system calls in sequence is
disregarded and only the frequency of each system call is preserved. It is used in previous
works.
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Figure 3.4 System calls trace transformation to Dataset
• Patterns frequency system calls representation combines features of the two previous rep-
resentations. Pattern-frequency representation regards the successive order information of
system calls in short pattern, and regards the frequency of each pattern in the sequence.
To the best of our knowledge, this representation has not been studied in the past in this
context.
The following notations are used hence forward. Consider the set of system calls∑=(s1,s2,s3. . . sm),
where m is the number of system calls of operating system. Let Ti be a finite sequence of sys-
tem calls and |Ti| represent the length of the sequence. Let ∑∗ be the set of all possible finite
sequences of system calls, Ti ∈∑∗. N is the number of applications (malware and benign) used
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in training and test phases. Let D be the set of of feature vectors {X1,X2, . . . ,XN} associated to
the application traces {T1,T2, . . . ,TN}. The feature vector Xi is defined according to the used
representation as explained in the coming subsections.
3.4.1 Successive system calls feature vector representation
This feature vector representation considers the sequential order information of system calls in
trace. Formally, this feature vector representation can be defined as follow: Xi = {si,1,si,2, . . . ,si,|Ti|},
Where si, j is a system calls of order j in the trace Ti. Figure 3.5 shows an example of successive
system calls representation.
Figure 3.5 Successive system calls feature vector
The space complexity of successive system call feature vector representation depends on the
number of traces (N) and the total length of these tracs. The space complexity is given by
O(|T |). Generally, the total length of traces is large. Therefore, this representation is space
consuming.
3.4.2 Bag of system calls feature vector representation
This feature vector representation disregards the ordering information of sequential system
calls. Only the frequency of system calls in the sequence is maintained. Formally, the fea-
tures vector can be defined as follow: Xi = {ni,1,ni,2, . . . ,ni,|∑ |}, where ni, j is the number of
occurrences of a system call s j in the sequence Ti.
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Figure 3.6 illustrates bag system calls representation of a benign application. Each number
in the sequence represents the frequency of a system call in the application trace. For exam-
ple, the numbers 5,0,0,10,75. . . correspond to frequency of the following system calls: fstat64,
setgroups32, setgid32, setuid32, getuid32 respectively, and the last attribute indicates the se-
quence of a benign application.
Figure 3.6 Bag of system calls feature vector
The space complexity of bag of system calls representation isO(N.|∑ |), where N is the number
of traces and |∑ | is number of system calls. |∑ | is not a large number. For example, Linux 2.6
has 317 system calls (Inoue and Somayaji, 2007). The cost of this feature vector is much less
than successive system calls feature vector representation cost.
3.4.3 l_Patterns frequency of system calls feature vector representation
This representation combines properties of the two previous representations. Pattern-frequency
representation regards the successive order information of system calls for short patterns, and
regards the frequency of those patterns in a trace. Formally, this feature vector representation
can be defined as follow: Xi = {ni,1,ni,2, . . . ,ni,|∑ |}, where ni, j is the number of occurrences
of a pattern p j of length l in the trace Ti and r is the number of possible patterns of length l
(r = |∑l |).
Figure 3.7 illustrates three-pattern frequency representation of a benign application. Each num-
ber represents the frequency of pattern of three system calls length. For example, the numbers
15,0,30,219,1 . . . represents the following: the pattern: (open, fstat64, mprotect) is repeated
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15 times, the pattern: (close, close, close) is repeated 0 time, the pattern: (mmap2, mprotect,
clone) is repeated 30 times, the pattern: (futex, futex, gettimeofday) is repeated 219 times, and
the pattern: (access, access, mkdir) is repeated 1 time, and the last attribute in indicates the
sequence for benign application.
Figure 3.7 Pattern frequency system call feature vector
The space complexity of l-patterns frequency of system calls representation is O(N.|∑l |),
where N is the number of traces and |∑l | number of possible patterns. For short patterns
(l = 2 or 3) and |∑ | = 317, ||∑l | is not a large number. This representation consumes more
space than bag of system calls feature vector and much less than successive system calls feature
vector.
3.4.4 Experiments and results
To measure and evaluate the impact of dataset feature vector representations on the classifica-
tion performance of the classifiers, The following two standard metrics are used:
• Accuracy rate is the rate of correct predictions over the whole dataset.
• False positive (FP) is the quantity of misclassifying malicious behaviors as benign.
The purpose of the machine learning algorithms is to find a classifier C: D → {benign, ma-
licious} that maximizes accuracy of right detection and minimizes false detection. Feature
vector representation has an impact on the accuracy and false positive rate of the machine
learning classifier.
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The dataset consists of a large set of system-call raw traces of benign and malicious applica-
tions. The benign applications are the top 100 popular free applications. They are downloaded
from the official Android applications store, Google Play (official market of Android appli-
cations). The 90 available Android real malwares are download from (blog Contagio: Mo-
bile malware, 2012). All applications are installed and executed on Samsung galaxy S device
running Android OS 2.3. The total number of applications in the dataset N = 190 (100 benign
applications + 90 malwares). The length of sequences varies, it is greatly depending on the ap-
plications. The shortest sequence has 10000 system calls, and the longest sequence has 60000
system calls.
The three feature vectors are examined on the following machine learning classifiers: support
vector machine (SVM), naïve bayes (NB), logistic regression (LR) and decision tree (DT).
These classifiers are obtained from the WEKA machine learning visual package (university of
waikato, 2012).
Table 3.6 Classification performance of support vector
machine classifier.
Feature vector Accuracy False positive rate
Successive system calls 95,10% 6,10%
Bag of system calls 92,50% 8,50%
Two-Pattern frequency 100% 0%
Three-Pattern frequency 100% 0%
Support vector machine (SVM) classifier classifies data by determining a set of support vec-
tors, which are members of the set of training inputs that outline a hyperplane in the feature
space (Mukkamala et al., 2002). Table 3.6 represents the support vector machine classifier
accuracy and false positive rates using different data representations.
Naïve bayes (NB) classifier is the simplest form of Bayesian network. It is based on Bayes
theorem with heavy independence assumptions (Smola and Vishwanathan, 2008). Table 3.7
shows the performance of naïve bayes classifier using different system calls representations.
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The three-pattern and two-pattern frequency representation has the best performance (97,10%
accuracy rate and 3,10% false positive rate). Bag of system calls representation has the worst
performance (91,30% accuracy and 9% false positive rate).
Table 3.7 Classification performance of naïve bayes
classifier.
Feature vector Accuracy False positive rate
Successive system calls 94,10% 6,30%
Bag of system calls 91,30% 9%
Two-Pattern frequency 97,10% 3,10%
Three-Pattern frequency 97,10% 3,10%
Logistic regression (LR) classifier is a discriminative model. It is strongly based on the logistic
function (Smola et Vishwanathan, 2008). Table 3.8 illustrates the impact of dataset represen-
tation on the performance of logistic regression classifier. The three-pattern frequency repre-
sentation has the highest performance. It has the highest accuracy rate (100%) and the lowest
false positive rate (0%). The 2-pattern frequency representation still performs better than the
two classical representations with 97,10% accuracy rate and 3,10% false positive rate. Bag of
system calls representation has the worst performance (92,30% accuracy and 8% false positive
rate).
Table 3.8 Classification performance of logistic
regression classifier.
Feature vector Accuracy False positive rate
Successive system calls 96% 4,10%
Bag of system calls 92,30% 8%
Two-Pattern frequency 97,10% 3,10%
Three-Pattern frequency 100% 0%
Decision tree (DT) classifier is built during the training phase. The nodes represent attributes,
the edges represent the possible attributes values, and leafs represent the classes. The classifi-
cation starts by the root node and moves down in the decision tree relative to attribute values
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till reach leaf (Amor et al., 2004). Table 3.9 demonstrates decision tree classifier influenced by
dataset representations. The classifier has better performance with pattern frequency system
calls representation than other dataset representations. The three-pattern frequency represen-
tation has the best performance with an accuracy rate 98,20% and false positive rate 2,10%.
Successive system calls representation has the worst performance with an accuracy rate 92,10%
and false positive rate 9,40%.
Table 3.9 Classification performance of decision tree
classifier.
Feature vector Accuracy False positive rate
Successive system calls 92,10% 9,40%
Bag of system calls 96% 4,10%
Two-Pattern frequency 97,10% 3,10%
Three-Pattern frequency 98,20% 2,10%
3.4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Feature vector representation has a considerable impact on the performance of machine learn-
ing classifiers. It increases the accuracy rate and decreases the false positive rate. The experi-
ment results affirm that the performance of classifiers is improved significantly with same data
quantity and type, but with using a different feature vector representation.
Three-pattern frequency feature vector has the best performance of all the experimented classi-
fiers; it reaches the idle performance of SVM classifier and logistic regression classifier (100%
accuracy rate and 0% false positive rate). The cost of improving the performance by using
dataset representation factor is low relative to other factors: benign behavior model and dataset
(size, type).
Because feature vector representation keeps the same dataset type and size, the required mem-
ory space is few extra space. The process of preparing feature vector representations is not
computationally expensive. Bag of system calls representation has the lowest space complex-
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ity and and acceptable accuracy. Successive system calls representation has the highest space
complexity, but it does not have the highest performance.
Short pattern system calls representation has extra space complexity than bag of system calls
representation, but it significantly improves the accuracy. The frequency property and the
successive property of system calls in sequence are important information in the classification
process. The pattern frequency property offers advantage by holding these two properties
which leads to a better classification process.

CHAPTER 4
CANONICAL BENIGN BEHAVIOR DATABASE APPROACH
4.1 Canonical database
Forrest et al. (1996) proposed a new paradigm to detect anomaly for UNIX programs. Their ap-
proach is based on monitoring of the system calls generated by a particular process. It builds a
database of all unique short system call patterns encountered during the execution of the given
process. This database represents the benign behavior of the monitored process. Therefore,
we assume that any system call pattern, which is not in the database, may identify an anoma-
lous behavior or a variation in benign behavior. This approach is simple and computationally
efficient because it does not have to compute frequency histograms or complex statistics or
identify the importance of particular patterns. It just checks the presence or the absence of a
pattern. This approach has been used on the UNIX operating system and outperformed numer-
ous approaches (Warrender et al., 1999; Forrest et al., 1996).
The approach suggested by (Forrest et al., 1996). builds a specific benign behavior database
for each process of interest. Because of the large number of applications available on Android
market, building up a separate database for each application is memory consuming and unreal-
istic to implement. Thus, our approach is to build a canonical benign behavior database from a
limited number of representative applications (Amamra et al., 2014).
This approach can be seen as the last line of defense in an in-depth protection strategy for
smartphone systems. In the absence of any specific detection mechanism, our approach may
have the last opportunity to detect any malicious activity. If a trusted model describing the be-
nign behavior of a given application is not available, one can use the canonical benign behavior
database instead.
The first step is to constitute a canonical benign behavior database composed of the short sys-
tem call patterns of benign applications. Benign behavior profiles have an important influence
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on malware detection process. An over-generalized profile would lead to a high rate of false
negative alarms (i.e., undetected malware). On the other hand, an under-generalized profile
would lead to a high rate of false positive alarms (i.e., benign applications reported as mal-
ware). Therefore, benign behavior profile must be consistent and stable.
In order to build a canonical benign behavior database, we have selected the 200 most down-
loaded free applications from the Google Play (official Android application market). These
applications have been installed and executed on a Samsung Galaxy S mobile phone running
Android 2.3. To construct the database of patterns of length k, the resulting traces have to go
through (i) the filtering and abstraction module described in the previous chapter and (ii) the
pattern extraction module to generate the pattern database. This latter module slides a window
of length k across the input traces and records all the encountered patterns. The duplicated
patterns are ignored. This process is shown in Figure 4.1 with k = 4. Different k values are
examined to determine the optimal value that ensures compact and efficient anomaly detection
system (Amamra et al., 2014).
Figure 4.1 Extraction of four-system call patterns with a sliding window
Figure 4.2 illustrates the number of unique patterns as function of the number of considered
applications. After training phase using 170 over 200 selected applications, the number of
unique patterns converged to 1,786 patterns.
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The pattern length is an important factor. It impacts the size of the database, the processing
complexity, and the detection capabilities. Short patterns produce a compact database, faster
training phase, and less overhead during anomaly detection process. However, short patterns
may not represent program behaviors efficiently. This may lead to low accuracy and high rate
of false positive alarms. Hence, the minimal pattern length that ensures compact and efficient
malware detection must be determined. This value depends on the granularity of kernel calls
and varies from one operating system to another and from one version of a given operating
system to another. Hofmeyr et al. (1998) have determined that six-system call is the best pattern
length for UNIX OS. In this work, Different pattern lengths are experimented to determine the
optimal value. These experiments are presented in Section 4.4.
Figure 4.2 The number of four-system call patterns in canonical database
benign behavior database as the number of application grows
4.2 Multi-pattern matching algorithms
Once the canonical database has been built, we can use it to detect abnormal behavior of new
applications. When an application is monitored, its patterns are compared against the canonical
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database, and the pattern does not exist in the database, can be encountered. Such a pattern is
called a mismatch.
Multi-pattern matching algorithms are used to verify the existence of new patterns in canonical
database. Therefore, the performance canonical database approach relies on the performance
of adopted multi-pattern matching algorithms (Amamra et al., 2012a). Formally, multi-pattern
matching problem can be defined as follows:
Considering an input text T = x1x2. . . xn of length n and a set S = {p1, p2, . . . , pm} of m key-
words. these keywords have different lengths. The problem is to find all occurrences of any of
these keywords in the input text T (Kouzinopoulos and Margaritis, 2011).
The naïve solution of this problem is to scan the input text T for each keyword, which requires
a total scanning time n ∗M, where M is the sum of keyword lengths. This solution is ineffi-
cient, especially with large input texts and large keywords set. In our context, the input text
T corresponds the trace of new application and the keywords corresponds the patterns of the
canonical benign behavior database.
Multi-pattern matching problem is efficiently solved by various algorithms. In the succeeding
text, the mostly known and used ones are explained in details.
4.2.1 Aho-Crosick (AC) algorithm
The Aho-Corasick or simply AC algorithm (Aho and Corasick, 1975; Kelly, 2006) main idea
is constructing a finite state automaton from the patterns during a pre-processing phase. The
automaton is then used to process an input text string T in a single pass by reading the char-
acters in T and making state transitions or emitting outputs. The automaton machine is based
on three functions: Goto, Fail, and Output function. The matching process is straightforward;
each transition between two states requires a constant time and only one input character is
read. The AC algorithm always has O(n) time complexity regardless of being in best, average
or worst case. The space complexity of the AC algorithm depends on the size of that automa-
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ton. Consequently, in the worst case the required space is in O((Sumo fKeywordsLengths)×
(Sizeo fAlphabet)).
4.2.2 Commentz-Walter (CW) algorithm
The Commentz-Walter (CW) algorithm (Commentz-Walter, 1979; Kelly, 2006) idea is similar
to the Aho-Cosick algorithm. Constructing the finite state automaton represents the reversed
keywords during the pre-processing phase and using a skip table that is similar to the Boyer
Moore algorithm (Boyer and Moore, 1977). The matching phase runs in time n/lmin, which is
the best case. In the case where the matching process keeps incrementing by one, the algorithm
runs on n∗ lmax , which is the worst case. lmin is the length of shortest keyword and lmax is the
length of the longest one. The space complexity of the algorithm depends mainly on the size
of the automaton. In the worst case, the required space is in O((Sumo fKeywordsLengths)×
(Sizeo fAlphabet)).
4.2.3 Wu-Manber (WM) algorithm
The Wu-Manber (WM) algorithm (Wu et al., 1994; Kelly, 2006) is based on the shifting idea of
Boyer Moore algorithm. This algorithm scans the input text by blocks of characters of size B,
instead of scanning characters one by one. The algorithm is based on three tables built during
the pre-processing phase: a SHIFT table, a HASH table, and a PREFIX table. In addition,
the space complexity of the algorithm depends on the size of those tables. The algorithm has
sub-linear running time complexity in the average case and quadratic in n in the worst case.
4.2.4 Set Backward Oracle Matching (SBOM) algorithm
The SBOM algorithm (Allauzen et al., 2001; Kelly, 2006) is based on an acyclic automaton
name factor oracle constructed from the set of reversed patterns. The factor oracle is created
during the pre-processing phase. In the matching phase, the algorithm scans the input text by
a sliding window of length lmin. In this window, the algorithm reads from right to left the
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longest suffix that labels a path from the initial state. The space complexity of the algorithm is
the factor oracle size, and it is at the most M+1 nodes. On average, SBOM time complexity
is sub-linear in n, but the worst case time complexity is in O(n∗M), where M is the sum of the
pattern lengths.
4.2.5 Algorithm requirements
Anomaly detection problem on smartphone systems is more specialized than the general pat-
terns matching problem. The choice of a matching algorithm for the anomaly detection prob-
lem depends on some specific requirements. Below, we list these requirements compiled from
the existing research targeting intrusion detection in general, and a recent contribution targeting
intrusion detection specific to mobile devices (Amamra et al., 2012a; Kelly, 2006; Van Lun-
teren et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2009):
• Efficient space complexity: because a smartphone system has limited memory space, the
matching algorithm should consume as less memory as possible. AC algorithm memory
requirement is related to the size of the automaton, which is related to the alphabet size
|∑ | and the sum of pattern lengths M. In the worst case, the space complexity is in O(M ∗
|∑ |). The space complexity of CW algorithm is based on the automaton and skip functions
is in O(M ∗ |∑ |)+ (skips f unctionrequirement). It is obviously more than the AC space
complexity. The WM space complexity is related to the space required by the three tables:
SHIFT, HASH and PREFIX. The SHIFT table size is in O(|∑ |B), where B is suffix block
length. The HASH table size is the number of SHIFT table elements containing 0. PREFIX
table size is in O(|∑ |B¯), where B¯ is the prefix block size. The space complexity of SBOM
algorithm is related to factor oracle for set of keywords. The factor in the worst case has
M+1 nodes. Then, the space complexity is in O(M+1) + transitions function.
• Efficient and Stable Performance: an algorithm has efficient and stable performance only if
it always runs on the same time complexity. A common attack on multi-pattern matching
algorithms is to force the algorithm to deliberately converge to the worse case complexity,
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which is very critical for resources-constrained devices, such as smartphone systems. The
AC algorithm time complexity is in O(n) in all cases, which means that AC has stable
performance. However, CW, WM and SBOM algorithms run in sub-linear time complexity
in the average case and in O(n2) in the worst case.
• Scalable: the multi-pattern matching algorithm should support new patterns and this can
be performed with acceptable cost/performance overhead. AC, CW, BSOM and WM are
sensitive to the number of patterns because the space complexities are based on the sum
of pattern lengths. The four algorithms support large number of patterns in addition to
memory cost.
From the aforementioned discussion, the AC algorithm is the best candidate because it has
efficient time and space complexities and stable performance which means resistant to the
attack that force the algorithm to run to the worse case complexity. Table 4.1 summarizes the
algorithms complexities and performance.
Table 4.1 Multi-pattern matching algorithms comparison.
Algorithm Time com-
plexity
Space com-
plexity
Stability Simple to un-
derstand and
implement
Aho-Crosick (AC) linear O(M×∑) Yes Yes
Comments-Walter (CW) sub− linear or
quadratic
O(M × |∑ |) +
skip function
No No
Wu-Manbar (WM) sub− linear or
quadratic
O(|∑B |) +
O(|∑B¯ |) +
HASH table
size
No No
SBOM sub− linear or
quadratic
O(M + 1)+
transition
function
No Yes
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4.3 Measuring abnormal behavior
When a new application is installed and executed on smartphone system. The system call trace
of this application is monitored, a pattern, which does not exist in the canonical database, can
be encountered. Such a pattern is called a mismatch. In such a case, we should evaluate how
abnormal this mismatch is. This can be done by measuring the minimal distance between this
mismatch and the patterns in the database. For this purpose, the Hamming distance is used.
The Hamming distance between two patterns pi and p j, denoted by dH(pi, p j), is simply given
by the number of non-matching positions. Therefore, the anomaly level of a mismatch p∗ with
respect to a database D can be measured as follows:
dmin(p∗) = min{dH(p∗, p), |p ∈ D} > 0 (4.1)
This value can be used during the monitoring of a new application to evaluate how abnormal
the application is. Different methods have been proposed in the literature. We review these
methods and propose a new one.
The first method is the number of encountered mismatches in a trace T . It is the simplest and
easiest method to evaluate the anomaly level of an application. Thus, the value is simply given
by
M(T ) = |{p∗ ∈ T |dmin(p∗)> 0}| (4.2)
An application is regarded as abnormal if the number of mismatches exceeds a certain thresh-
old (Forrest et al., 1996; Hofmeyr et al., 1998). However, this value does not take into con-
sideration the anomaly level of the different mismatches. It considers the minimal mismatched
patterns as the maximal ones. However, they may not represent the same threat.
Table 4.2 presents the number of mismatches found in the traces of three different applications
using four-system-call patterns. Applications 1 and 2 have the same number of mismatches,
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but these mismatches have different anomaly levels. On the other hand, application 3 has less
mismatches than Application 1, but they have higher anomaly levels. Thus, the number of
mismatches does not capture the real threat of an application.
Table 4.2 The anomaly levels of the traces based on for four-system call patterns
App number Nb. of mismatches and their anomaly level Measures of anomaly level
dmin(·) = 4 dmin(·) = 3 dmin(·) = 2 dmin(·) = 1 M(T ) SA(T ) SW (T )
1 1 0 0 199 200 1 1.02
2 100 80 20 0 200 1 3.40
3 0 100 50 20 170 0.75 2.47
Another method to evaluate the anomaly level of an application trace T has been introduced
by Hofmeyr et al. (Hofmeyr et al., 1998). This value represents the strength of the abnormal
signal in pattern of length k and is defined as follows:
SA(T ) =
max{dmin(p∗)|p∗ ∈ T}
k
(4.3)
This value is simple and is independent of the trace length. However, this level indicates
only the mismatch with the highest anomaly level without giving any clear idea of how other
mismatches are distributed.
In Table 4.2, application 1 and application 2 have the same SA value, but they should not
represent the same threat since application 1 has only one pattern with SA = 1 while application
2 has hundred such patterns. Similarly, Application 3 has smaller SA value than application 1
but its threat should be higher since application 3 has more mismatches with greater anomaly
levels.
The number of mismatches and the mismatches strength are two important factors to quantify
the anomaly level of a trace T . Therefore, we introduce a weighted anomaly level SW which
takes into consideration both factors (Amamra et al., 2014). It is defined as follows:
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SW (T ) =
k
∑
i=1
wi× pi(T ) (4.4)
where pi(T ) is the percentage of mismatches in the trace T having anomaly level i and wi is
the weight associated to a mismatch having anomaly level i.
We simply define wi = i. In such a case, SW (T ) is either 0 or greater or equal to 1. Obviously,
this value can be parametrized and different weights could be defined by the user of such a
system. For example, w1 can be set to 0 to reduce too many false positive alarms. At the other
end of the spectrum, wk can be set to 2k to give much more importance to greater mismatches.
Table 4.2 presents the values of the weighted anomaly level for our three applications. This
method seems to be more intuitive as expected. The trace of Application 2 represents a greater
deviation from the benign behavior database. Similarly, the trace of Application 1 represents a
smaller deviation.
4.4 Experiments and results
The experiments are presented in the following two subsections. In the first one, we evaluate
the impact of the filtering and abstraction process on the size of the traces and on the use of
the smartphone system resources. In the second one, we evaluate the accuracy of the proposed
anomaly-based detection technique. In this case, we have to address two specific questions:
• Does the fact of removing irrelevant system calls have a positive impact on the capability
of distinguishing malwares from benign applications?
• Does the approach of using a canonical benign behavior database make any sense as a last
line of defense?
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4.4.1 Trace size and resource usage
Large traces have negative impacts on the performance of anomaly-based malware detection
techniques. Reducing the size of the traces while preserving the characteristics of the appli-
cation behavior is an important step for improving the performance of these techniques on
resource-limited environments. The number of patterns in the benign behavior database essen-
tially determines the efficiency of the anomaly detection approach. Hence, we first examine
the impacts of filtering and abstraction process on the number of patterns.
Table 4.3 The reduction of the benign behavior database size
Pattern length k Nb. of patterns in the raw
DataBase
Nb. of patterns in the re-
fined DataBase
Improvement
4 17068 1786 91 %
6 97855 8283 93 %
8 302880 23221 94 %
The patterns are collected from the traces of 170 most downloadable applications as explained
in Section 4.1. Table 4.3 shows the number of patterns before and after the filtering and ab-
straction process. For example, in the case of four-system call patterns, the number of patterns
generated from the raw traces is 17068 patterns. This number is reduced to only 1786 patterns
after the filtering and abstraction process.
Traditionally, finite-state automaton can be used to retrieve in linear time the rare occurrences
of a set of patterns in a given chain as explained in Section 4.2(e.g., Aho-Corasick algo-
rithm (Aho and Corasick, 1975)). A typical application of such an algorithm is an antivirus
software looking for known viruses. In a dual approach, a finite-state automaton can easily
encode p legitimate k-system call patterns. In such a case, it is possible to retrieve in O(n)
time the rare occurrences of unknown patterns (the mismatches) in a given trace composed of
n system calls. Such a finite-state automaton can be computed in O(k · p · |Σ|) time and space
where Σ represents the system-call alphabet.
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The proposed approach is performed on Samsung Galaxy S mobile phone with 64 MB memory
and 1GHz CPU. The results are reported in Table 4.4. As we can see, the anomaly-based
malware detection technique based on the analysis of short patterns in program traces is now
possible in resource-limited smartphone systems.
Table 4.4 Time and space complexities of the anomaly-based malware detection
technique using k-system call patterns
Pattern length Raw DB Refined DB
CPU usage Memory usage CPU usage Memory usage
4 40% 8MB 4% 4MB
6 55% 22MB 6% 5MB
8 75% 50MB 13% 10MB
4.4.2 Anomaly detection
In this section, we evaluate the impacts of the filtering and abstraction process on the accu-
racy performance of our anomaly-based detection technique using k-system call patterns. This
process is expected to reduce the amount of information irrelevant to describe the application
behaviors without any negative impacts on the malware detection capabilities.
The experiments evaluate the malware detection capabilities before and after the filtering and
abstraction process. We analyse the system call traces of 50 benign and 50 malicious appli-
cations with the canonical benign behavior database described in Section 4.1 and evaluate the
anomaly level of these traces.
For reliable evaluation, we use two different methods to evaluate the abnormality of the traces
with respect to the corresponding benign behavior database: the anomaly level SA that is
highly recommended by (Hofmeyr et al., 1998), and our proposed weighted anomaly level
SW (Amamra et al., 2014).
The experiments have been done for three different pattern lengths (k = 4,6 and 8) in order to
evaluate the performance of our malware detection approach with respect to this parameter.
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4.4.2.1 The accuracy evaluation
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the anomaly-based detection technique based on the k-
system call patterns, we use the following measures: the false positive (FP) rate, the false
negative (FN) rate and the accuracy. These measures are defined formally as follows:
• FN is the percentage of misclassified malwares as benign applications.
• FP is the percentage of misclassified benign applications as malwares.
• The accuracy is the percentage of correct predictions over all data i.e.
true benign applications + true malwares
number of evaluated applications
.
4.4.2.2 Anomaly detection without using the filtering and abstraction process
For the first experiment, we evaluate the accuracy performance of our malware detection tech-
nique using the raw traces and the raw canonical benign behavior database composed of four-
system call patterns. 50 benign applications and 50 malicious applications have been used for
this test.
Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of the anomaly level SA values. These values can be clearly
separated with a threshold set at 0.5 – i.e.,the minimum Hamming distance between any unseen
pattern in a given trace and any pattern in the database is at least two. Unfortunately, depending
whether the limit cases are classified as benign or malicious applications, either four benign
applications or three malicious applications are faultily identified. As we can expect, the false
positive alarms are rather annoying for the users and must be reduced as much as possible.
The test has been repeated with the weighted anomaly level SW introduced in this section.
Figure 4.4 presents the distribution of the weighted anomaly level SW values. Even if these
values can be clearly separated, it is harder to set the threshold. SW can take any value
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Figure 4.3 The distribution of the SA anomaly level values
for the raw traces of benign and malicious applications
(using 4-system call patterns)
greater or equal to 1, except for the value 0 in the perfect cases without any discovered mis-
match. Hence, the figure shows the distribution of the values using the following intervals:
0, [1 · · ·1.1), [1.1 · · ·1.2) · · · [1.5 · · ·+∞).
To reduce the false positive alarm rate as much as possible without accepting too many mali-
cious applications, the threshold has been set to 1.2. This misclassifies two benign applications
and eight malicious ones.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the accuracy performance of our malware detection technique
using the raw traces and the raw database.
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Figure 4.4 The distribution of the SW weighted anomaly level
values for the raw traces of benign and malicious applications
(using 4-system call patterns)
Table 4.5 The accuracy performance of malware detection technique using the raw
traces and the SA anomaly level
Four-system call patterns Six-system call patterns Eight-system call patterns
SA FP FN Accuracy SA FP FN Accuracy SA FP FN Accuracy
0.25 8% 0% 96% 0.33 4% 0% 98% 0.25 0% 0% 100%
0.5 0% 6% 97% 0.5 0% 8% 96% 0.5 0% 12% 94%
Table 4.6 The accuracy performance of malware detection technique using the raw
traces and the SW weighted anomaly level
Four-system call patterns Six-system call patterns Eight-system call patterns
SW FP FN Accuracy SW FP FN Accuracy SW FP FN Accuracy
< 1.1 6% 4% 95% < 1.1 8% 0% 95% < 1.3 8% 4% 96%
< 1.2 4% 16% 90% < 1.2 4% 2% 97% < 1.4 6% 8% 93%
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4.4.2.3 Anomaly detection using the filtering and abstraction process
In this part of the experiment, we add the filtering and abstraction process to the malware
detection technique. We evaluate the accuracy performance of our approach using the same
applications and the same anomaly levels SA and SW .
Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of the anomaly level SA values. These values can be per-
fectly separated in this case. Therefore, refining the traces (and a fortiori the database) allows
to select a higher and therefore stricter threshold of 0.75, which should reduce the crucial false
positive alarm rate.
Figure 4.5 The distribution of the SA anomaly level values
for the refined traces of benign and malicious applications
(using 4-system call patterns)
Finally, we evaluate the accuracy performance of the approach using the weighted anomaly
level SW . Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of anomaly level SW values. No mismatch has
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appeared in the benign application traces. However, setting the threshold too low may be dan-
gerous. Setting the threshold to 1.2 as in the previous section still gives a perfect classification.
Thus, it should be more prudent to select a stricter (and more conservative) threshold to avoid
any eventual outlier in the benign applications.
Figure 4.6 The distribution of the SW weighted anomaly level
values for the refined traces of benign and malicious applications
(using 4-system call patterns)
For practical purpose, the threshold can be predetermined by the security administrator of the
system or by the user according to his need through the threshold parameter in the system
setting.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 summarize the accuracy performance of our malware detection technique
using the filtering and abstraction process to refine the traces.
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Table 4.7 The accuracy performance of malware detection technique using the refined
traces and the SA anomaly level
4-system call patterns 6-system call patterns 8-system call patterns
SA FP FN Accuracy SA FP FN Accuracy SA FP FN Accuracy
0.75 0% 0% 100% 0.50 0% 0% 100% 0.50 0% 0% 100%
1.00 0% 4% 98% 0.66 0% 72% 64% 0.625 0% 64% 68%
Table 4.8 The accuracy performance of malware detection technique using the refined
traces and the SW weighted anomaly level
4-system call patterns 6-system call patterns 8-system call patterns
SW FP FN Accuracy SW FP FN Accuracy SW FP FN Accuracy
< 1.2 0% 0% 100% < 1.2 0% 0% 100% < 1.2 6% 2% 96%
< 1.4 0% 4% 98% < 1.4 0% 2% 99% < 1.4 0% 4% 98%
For fair estimation and comparison of the approach of using canonical benign behavior database,
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves are constructed for all proposed schemes and
are illustrated in Figure 4.7. A ROC curve shows trade-offs between the malware detection rate
and false alarm rate when different threshold are used. It is commonly used to visualize and
estimate the accuracy performance of detectors Fawcett (2006). It is apparent in Figure 4.7
that the proposed approach is a promising anomaly malware detection technique where all the
curves are bulged further outward to the perfect point (0,1).
Figure 4.7(a) illustrates the accuracy performance of the approach without the filtering and
abstraction process. The approach with six-system call patterns outperform the others. With
the filtering and abstraction process, The approach with four-system calls and six-system call
patterns reached the perfect curve as illustrated in of Figure 4.7(b). However, the approach
with four-system call patterns has less time and space complexities.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Our general objective was to investigate whether it was possible to implement on resource-
limited smartphone systems a malware detection technique based on the analysis of system
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Figure 4.7 The ROC curves of the anomaly malware detection
using the canonical benign behavior database appraoch
calls (Forrest et al., 1996, 2008; Hofmeyr et al., 1998). To achieve this objective, two different
goals had to be addressed.
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Our first goal was to determine whether it was possible to reduce the amount of resources
needed to implement the proposed approach. We have presented a filtering and abstraction
process, which considers only a limited number of system calls. Such a process significantly
reduces the size of the database describing the benign behavior of the applications. Our ex-
perimentations clearly show that smartphone systems can find out in real time any abnormal
pattern of system calls. In fact, they can retrieve these m mismatches in O(n+m · k · p) time,
where n is the size of the trace and p the number of distinct legitimate k system-call patterns.
Since m is relatively small for any benign application (according to our empirical results), such
a naïve approach is acceptable.
Unpredictably, refining the traces (and therefore loosing some information) does not impact
significantly the capability to distinguish between benign and malicious applications. One
explanation is the fact that irrelevant system calls are discarded and it may simpler to discover
the real intentions of the applications.
Our second objective was to evaluate the approach of using a canonical benign behavior database
to distinguish between benign and malicious applications. This database is simply built with
the most popular benign applications found on Android market. Obviously, such an approach
cannot be as perfect as building application-specific models. However, this latter approach is
unrealistic – just too many applications! In an in-depth protection strategy, we need a last line
of defense when no application-specific approach exists. In such cases, we want to reduce the
false positive alarms as much as possible to avoid annoying the users and to catch as much as
possible malwares – we do not have to be perfect, simply good!
Further analysis would have to be done – eventually with real users in real deployment set-
ups. It may be possible that few canonical benign behaviors have to be used – depending on a
classification of the applications. However, our first experimentations are promising.
In conclusion, our filtering and abstraction process allows us to propose a lightweight tech-
nique, which can be used as the last line of defense of an in-depth protection strategy for
smartphone systems. It would be interesting to evaluate whether this process could be used
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to implement more advanced malware detection techniques based on machine learning algo-
rithms.

CHAPTER 5
MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIERS
5.1 Generative vs discriminative classifier
Machine learning is an active research field, which develops systems learning how to distin-
guish between different classes of data. In their initial training phases, these systems establish
the models characterizing the data. These models are simply defined by their parameters (Al-
paydin, 2004). Generally, there are two main categories of machine learning classifiers: gener-
ative classifiers and discriminative classifiers (Bishop et al., 1995; Ulusoy and Bishop, 2006).
To clarify the difference between the two categories of classifiers, consider the following simple
scenario:
Suppose an Android application a, which is described by a feature vector x, belongs to either
one of the two classesC= {benign, malicious}. From a probabilistic perspective, the objective
of a classifier is to find the conditional distributions Pr(c|x), for c ∈ C, in order to predict
whether an application a is benign or malicious.
The generative one-class classifiers capture the generation process of x by modelling the joint
distribution Pr(x,c) as a parametric model, and then subsequently use this joint distribution to
infer the conditional distribution Pr(c|x) in order to predict whether or not a new application
belongs to a given class (Ulusoy and Bishop, 2006; Y. Ng and Mihael I, 2002). In such a case,
the training phase just needs the training data from the given class – in our setting, the benign
applications. This approach is particularly interesting since it may be hard to find instances of
malicious applications.
By contrast, the discriminative multi-class classifiers use parametric models to represent the
conditional distribution Pr(c|x). The parameters of a model are established during a training
phase on a set of labelled data (x,c). In such a case, these data must contain data from each
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class. The resulting model can be used later on to predict which class a new application most
likely belongs to (Ulusoy and Bishop, 2006).
Figure 5.1 A discriminative binary classifier vs. a generative
one-class classifier
Figure 5.1 illustrates the difference between (a) a generative one-class classifier and (b) a
discriminative two-class (or binary) classifier. The generative one-class classifier focuses on
understanding the basic description of the class composed of the benign applications, whereas
the discriminative binary classifier tries to model the boundaries between benign and malicious
applications.
Both approaches have some advantages and disadvantages. The discriminative classifiers are
very fast at making the prediction for new applications, and they are quite accurate (Ulu-
soy and Bishop, 2006; Tu, 2007). On the other hand, the generative classifiers can treat par-
tially labelled or/and unlabelled data. They can readily treat variances of the models, whereas
discriminative models should see all possible variances during training. Generative classifiers
use only a single class data for the training process (Tu, 2007). Unfortunately, such approaches
often have limited performance accuracies for many applications (Gong, 2008; Yu et al., 2008).
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In this work, we analyze two classical classifiers, one from each category. Support vector ma-
chine (SVM) classifier is selected to represent discriminative category and k-means classifier
is selected to represent generative category.
5.1.1 The support vector machine (SVM) classifier
Among the different discriminative classifiers, the support vector machine (SVM) classifier is
one of the successful machine learning classifiers for the anomaly detection problem. The two-
class SVM learning has relatively fast processing and high detection performance (Shon and Moon,
2007).
Support vector machine classifier tries to find a hyperplane separating the points representing
the benign and the malicious applications of the training set. In such a case, an optimal solution
would be defined by a pair of parallel hyperplanes delimiting the widest zone (with respect to
the orthogonal Euclidean distance) separating the given points.
Unfortunately, such a perfect separation hyperplane does not always exist. In such a case, the
constraints should be relaxed and some points may be misclassified. The soft-margin SVM
was proposed by Cortes and Vapnik (1995) to solve this problem efficiently. It introduces the
slack variables ξi and the penalty of cost C ·ξi for the misclassified points. The slack variables
ξi determine whether the corresponding points are misclassified or not – i.e., being on the
wrong side of the separation hyperplane. If 0 < ξi ≤ 1, the given point is too close to the
separating hyperplane. If ξi > 1, the point is simply on the wrong side. Hence, the formulation
of soft-margin SVM optimization problem is given by:
min
||w||2
2
+C ·
n
∑
i=1
ξi (5.1)
subject to the constraints yi(wxi+b)≥ 1−ξi and ξi ≥ 0, for i= 1, · · · ,n.
The function ‖ ‖2 denotes the Euclidean distance in the Euclidean space Rd . The training
data (xi, yi) is used to compute the normal vector to the hyberplane w and threshold b. C is a
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parameter to be chosen by the user, it controls the trade-off between maximizing the margin
and minimizing the training error. A smallC allows the margin constraints to be easily violated.
This is equivalent to create wide margin around the decision boundary. On other hand, a large
C makes the margin constraints hard to be violated (Chapelle et al., 2002). Figure 5.2 illustrates
the soft-margin SVM separating between two different classes in the 2-dimensional Euclidean
plane.
Once the support vector have been trained, it can be used to determine the class of given test
application x. the decision function is given by:
f (x) = sgn(w.x+b) (5.2)
The first algorithm used to solve the above quadratic optimization problem is "chunking" algo-
rithm. The time complexity of the "chunking" algorithm is in O(n3) and the space complexity
is in O(n2) (Tsang et al., 2005), where n is the training set size. An alternative algorithm
has been proposed which is Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) learning algorithm (Platt
et al., 1999). SMO has O(n2) time complexity and O(n) space complexity (Platt et al., 1999).
In classification phase, it simply requires the time complexity to evaluate the equation (5.2)
which is O(m), where m is the size of test set. In our experiments, we have used SMO algo-
rithm.
5.1.2 The k-means classifier
One-class classification differs from the multi-class classification in its fundamental aspect.
In one-class classification, only the information of the given class is used during the training
phase. Therefore, one-class classification could be used when the data from the other classes
are difficult to obtain (e. g., malicious applications).
The k-means classifier has been selected as a generative one-class classifier due to its sim-
plicity, stability, and efficiency. It converges rapidly to either local or global minimum (Jain,
109
Figure 5.2 Soft margin Support vector machine
2010). This classifier is one of the simplest unsupervised classifiers solving the clustering prob-
lem. The k-means classifier assumes that the data of the given class can be clustered around
a set of centroids points c j, j = 1,2, · · ·k. The number of centroids should be determined be-
forehand (Chiang and Mirkin, 2010; Sugar and James, 2003). Figure 5.3 illustrates k-means
classifier with two centroids.
The locations of the centroids can be optimized during the training phase by minimizing the
following cost function:
f (S,c1, · · · ,ck) =
k
∑
j
∑
xi∈S j
‖xi− c j‖2 (5.3)
where the set S j partition the dataset S.
This problem is known to be NP-hard.Thereofre, k-means algorithms are approximation algo-
rithms, which generally converge to local optima (Jain, 2010).
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Figure 5.3 One-class k-means classifier with two centroids
After the training phase, the target data is organized in clusters and each cluster has centroid
and radius. The radius represents the distance between the centroid and the most distant point
of the same cluster and it determines the bounds of the normality.
During the classification phase, the membership function is calculated as follow:
f (x) = min
j
‖x− c j‖2 (5.4)
The result f (x) is compared with a threshold T . If it is less than or equal to the threshold, x
would be assumed to be a member of the class. Otherwise, it would not.
The two main ways used for setting the threshold T value are:
• The threshold is set such that the data located in the far tails of the distribution are rejected.
For example, Giacinto et al. (2005) and Ratle et al. (2007) had set target rejection rate to
5%.
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• The threshold is set equal to the radius of the nearest centroid (Hodge and Austin, 2004).
In our experiments, we adopted this threshold settings.
The time complexity of the training phase is in O(n× d× k× l) where n is the number of
training vectors, d is the dimension of the vectors representing the data points, k is the number
of centroids and l is the number of iterations until the cost function f (S,c1, · · · ,ck) no longer
changes. The space complexity is in O((n+ k)× d) (Tan et al., 2005). The classification/de-
tection phase is much faster. Its time complexity is in O(d× k), and its space complexity is
simply in O(k).
5.1.3 Experiments and results
To evaluate the accuracy performance of the classifiers, the confusion matrix (Fawcett, 2006)
is used as presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 The confusion matrix.
Actual class
Malware Benign
Predicted class
Malware True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Benign False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
The true positive rate (TPR) is the proportion of malicious applications that are correctly classi-
fied. The true negative rate (TNR) is the proportion of the benign applications that are correctly
classified. Whereas, the false positive rate (FPR) is the proportion of misclassified benign ap-
plications as malicious applications and the false negative rate (FNR) is the proportion of the
undetected malicious applications. Traditionally, the accuracy (Fawcett, 2006) evaluates the
correctness and the overall detection rate of the classifiers. It measures the overall detection
rate.
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5.1.3.1 The experiment protocol
The classical f -fold cross validation test (Dietterich, 2000; Kohavi et al., 1995) is usually
employed for credible evaluation of classifiers. This test splits the data set into f subsets of
equal size. Once the data set has been partitioned, one subset is selected and the classifier is
trained on the other f −1 subsets. The classifier then tries to identify the data from the selected
subset. Since the data has been labelled beforehand, the accuracy of the classifier on that subset
can be evaluated. This experiment is repeated for each of the f subsets. The average μ and
the standard deviation σ of the accuracy values are computed, which represent the average
performance of the classifier. The advantage of such a test is that all instances of the data
are eventually used for both the training phase and the classifying/detecting phase. Thus, the
experiment results should be more representative of the real classifier accuracy.
Confidence interval (Dietterich, 2000) illustrates the reliability of an estimate. It is given by
the following formula:
μ ± z× σ√
f
(5.5)
The confidence level parameter z is usually given by the cumulative normal distribution func-
tion. For example, z= 1,96 for a confidence interval of 95%.
To determine the optimal parameters of the classifiers, the dataset is divided into two sets:
validation set and test set. The validation set is used to validate the model, where different
parameters are tried and the model of the best accuracy performance is selected. In the case
of the k-means classifier, the number of centroids k impacts the complexity and classification
process of the classifier. Therefore, determining the optimal k is very important. In the case of
SVM classifier, the C parameter controls the tradeoff between margin maximization and error
minimization. In addition, it impacts the classifier complexity.
After determining the best classifier models, the test set is used to test this model. 5-fold cross
validation is used and each experiment is repeated 10 times and the reported results are the
mean of the 10 repetition.
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5.1.3.2 The dataset for experiments
The dataset used to evaluate the classifiers is composed of the system call traces of 100 benign
applications and 100 malicious applications. The benign applications are the most downloaded
applications from Android official market (Google Play). The malicious applications are real
malware that are downloaded from (blog Contagio: Mobile malware, 2012).
In our experiment, the version of the Android operating system is 2.3 based on Linux 2.6. It has
317 different system calls. On the other hand, the filtered-and-abstraction process reduces this
number to 125. This should significantly improve the performances of the different classifiers.
The dataset is divided into 10-folds. Each fold consists of 10 vectors representing benign
applications and 10 vectors representing malicious applications. The first 5-folds are used to
fix the parameters of models (validation process) and the second 5-folds are used to test the
model performance (test process).
5.1.3.3 The results
As mentioned in Section 5.1, two classifiers have been chosen for the experiments: the k-
means and the SVM classifiers. The selected implementations of these classifiers come from
the WEKA machine learning visual package (university of waikato, 2012).
The k-means classifier
The k-means classifier is a generic one-class classifier. Hence, it is trained only with the benign
applications, and it is tested with the benign and the malicious applications. The performance
of the k-means classifier depends greatly on the number of clusters k. To determine the optimal
k value for our dataset, a simple exhaustive search using 5-folds cross validation is used. Dif-
ferent values of k are tried, and the model with best accuracy is picked. Figure 5.4 illustrates
values of k and the accuracy corresponds to each model. For raw traces, k = 5 is the optimal
value, whereas the optimal one for refined traces is k = 2.
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Figure 5.4 k-means accuracy vs. the value of k for raw and
refined traces
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 report the experiment results of the validated models of the classifier
on the raw and refined traces respectively. On the raw traces, the malware detection rate (TP) is
around 81% and the false positive alarm rate (FP) is around 22.5%. Unfortunately, the overall
accuracy performance is relatively poor at 80%. The prediction performance of the classifier
can be significantly improved if the refined traces are used instead. Around 90% of malicious
applications are detected, while only 9% of the benign applications are identified as malicious
applications. The overall accuracy performance of the classifier is relatively good at 90%.
Table 5.2 k-means accuracy performance using the raw traces.
Actual class
Malware Benign
Predicted class
Malware 81,80%±2,35% 22,50%±2,80%
Benign 18,20%±2,35% 77,50%±2,80%
Accuracy = 79,65%±2,53%
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Table 5.3 k-means accuracy performance using the refined
traces.
Actual class
Malware Benign
Predicted class
Malware 90,70%±1,45% 8,90%±1,65%
Benign 9,30%±1,45% 91,10%±1,65%
Accuracy = 90,90%±1,53%
The SVM classifier
The performance of the SVM classifier is largely dependent on the parameterC. It is important
to find the optimal fitting value without over fitting the model. Increasing the value of C
increases the misclassification cost and produces a more accurate classifier at the risk of losing
the generalization properties. Furthermore, a large value of C usually increases the training
time. On the other hand, decreasing false classified instances improves accuracy performance.
To determine the optimal C value for our dataset, “grid-search” using 5-folds cross validation
has been used (Chang and Lin, 2011). Various values of C parameter has been tried, and the
model with best accuracy has been selected.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the SVM accuracy vs different C values. The optimal value of C for the
raw traces is 35, and the optimal one for the refined traces is 25.
Table 5.4 reports the accuracy performance of the two-class SVM classifier on the raw traces
of the optimal models. The malware detection rate is relatively high, but unfortunately the false
positive and negative alarm rates are not negligible. Nevertheless, the two-class SVM classifier
has a good overall accuracy rate of 92%. The performance is even better on the refined traces
as illustrated in Table 5.5. The results are simply perfect on the refined traces.
5.1.3.4 Resources usage
To evaluate the resource usage and the performance of each classifier, these classifiers are
implemented and executed on Google Nexus S smartphone device. Table 5.6 illustrates the
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Figure 5.5 SVM accuracy vs C parameter
Table 5.4 SVM classification results using the raw traces.
Actual class
Malware Benign
Predicted class
Malware 92,30%±1,09% 7,70%±1,40%
Benign 7,66%±1,09% 92,50%±1,40%
Accuracy = 92,32%±1,15%
used space of the both classifiers is very close in the case of raw traces and they used the same
space in refined traces. From the execution time point of view, SVM classifier is faster than the
Table 5.5 SVM classification results using the refined traces.
Actual class
Malware Benign
Predicted class
Malware 100% 0%
Benign 0% 100%
Accuracy = 100%
k-means classifier in both cases. The refined traces improve the execution time of the k-means
classifier by 49,69%, and the SVM classifier by 43,27%.
Table 5.6 Time and space complexities of SVM and k-means
classifiers.
Raw traces Refined traces
Space usage (MB) Time (ms) Space usage (MB) Time (ms)
k-means 11 10619 9 5277
SVM 12 594 9 257
5.2 Hybrid classifier
Machine learning classifiers are extensively used for anomaly detection problem. For exam-
ple, Bose et al. (2008) proposed a framework to detect smartphone malwares based on the SVM
classifier. Shabtai et al. (2012) proposed a framework that applies different machine learning
classifiers (e.g., k-means, logistic regression, histograms, decision tree, bayesian networks and
naïve bayes) to detect malwares of smartphone system. The benign behaviors are constructed
by training a single classifier. The single classifiers yield good classification results. However,
anomaly-based detection techniques still need more investigations and improvements. In this
chapter, we investigate and evaluate the possibility of enhancing the performance of anomaly-
based detection by using hybrid machine learning classifiers. A hybrid classifier combines two
or more different single classifiers in order to improve the classification process.
A hybrid classifier is a set of classifiers whose single predictions are combined in some way
to classify new samples. They use the output of the classifiers without considering details
of their implementation. Hybrid classifiers produce higher prediction accuracy at the meta-
level (Amamra et al., 2012c; Džeroski and Ženko, 2004; Sigletos et al., 2005). In this chapter,
we examine the approach proposed by Wolpert (1992). It is an old approach for combining
multiple classifiers, known as stacked generalization or stacking. The key idea of this approach
is to combine multiple classifiers by training the higher-level classifier by the output predictions
of the lower-level classifiers, estimated via cross validation as follow:
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The dataset D consists of a set of feature vectors D=< xi,yi >, where the vector xi is a system
call feature vector of an application and the type yi indicates whether this application is benign
or malicious. For j-cross validation, the given dataset D is divided into j almost equal-sized
disjoint folds: d1,d2, . . . ,d j. The lower-level classifiersC1,C2, . . . ,Cn are generated by training
the learning algorithms L1,L2, . . . ,Ln respectively on j− 1 folds and using the jth fold for
testing the classifiers. The predictions of the lower-level classifiers on a feature vector xk and
its original class type yk, form a new feature vector for the upper-level classifier as illustrated
in Figure 5.6. This process is repeated with each fold. At the end of this process, the union
of the prediction feature vectors represent the new dataset that is used for training upper-level
learning algorithm LM and producing meta-level classifierCM.
Figure 5.6 Stacking training phase
In order to classify a new instance, it is first applied to lower-level classifiers. The predictions of
these classifiers are concatenated with the original class type and form the upper-level feature
vector. The upper-level classifier CM assigns class type to this vector, which is the final class
type prediction of the new instance. The classification process is illustrated in Figure 5.7.
The main advantage of the stacking approach is its simplicity. It is easy to treat the classifiers
as black boxes, without considering the details of their implementations. As well as using the
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Figure 5.7 Stacking classification phase
predictions of lower-level classifiers as inputs for the upper-level allows to correct the misclas-
sified instances and improve the overall prediction accuracy.
5.2.1 Experiment results
The experimental results follows the same approach as one used in chapters 4 and 5. In order
to evaluate the performance of hybrid classifiers and compared with single classifiers, system
call traces of benign and malicious applications are collected. The benign applications rep-
resent the hundred most downloaded free applications. These applications are downloaded
from Android’s official market. The malicious applications are hundred real malwares that are
downloaded from (blog Contagio: Mobile malware, 2012). All applications are installed and
executed on Android 2.3 version. The adopted feature vector is bag of system calls as presented
in chapter 3, where each system call is presented by its frequency.
The used metrics to evaluated the accuracy performance of the classifiers are: the false positive
and the overall accuracy. The used machine learning classifiers in this chapter are obtained
fromwekamachine learning visual package (university of waikato, 2012). Due to the limitation
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of resources of smartphone, in this experiment, we evaluate the simplest hybrid classifier of two
levels and only one classifiers in each level. The selected classifiers are: support vector machine
(SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), naive bayes (NB) and logistic regression (LR).
Firstly, the classifiers (single and hybrid) are evaluated using the raw traces. The prediction
accuracy of SVM, ANN and hybrid SVM-ANN classifiers is reported in Table 5.7. SVM
has better performance than ANN classifier. However, Hybrid SVM-ANN classifier performs
better than both single classifiers. It significantly reduces the false positive and improves the
prediction accuracy.
Table 5.7 SVM, ANN and hybrid SVM-ANN classifiers
accuracy performance.
Classifier Accuracy False Positive
SVM 92,50% 8,50%
ANN 89,60% 11,50%
Hybrid (SVM-ANN) 96% 4%
Table 5.8 shows the prediction accuracy of 3 classifiers, naïve bayes (NB), logistic regression
(LR) and the corresponding hybrid NB-LR. Logistic regression is better than naïve bayes.
However, hybrid NB-LR classifier performs better than Logistic regression classifier.
Table 5.8 NB, LR and Hybrid NB-LR classifiers accuracy
performance.
Classifier Accuracy False Positive
Naïve bayes 91,30% 9%
Logistic regression 92,30% 8%
Hybrid (NB-LR) 94,10% 6%
Table 5.9 shows the high prediction accuracy of hybrid classifier SVM-NB relative to their
single classifiers SVM and Naïve Bayes. SVM has lower FP rate (8.50%) and higher accuracy
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(92.50%) than Naïve Bayes. However, hybrid classifier SVM-NB reduces false positive and
increases accuracy.
Table 5.9 SVM, NB and Hybrid SVM-NB classifiers
performance.
Classifier Accuracy False Positive
SVM 92,50% 8,50%
Naïve bayes 91,30% 9%
Hybrid (SVM-NB) 94,50% 5,50%
Table 5.10 illustrates the efficient performance of a new possible hybrid classifier LR-ANN rel-
ative to their individual classifier logistic regression (LR) and ANN. Logistic regression is more
efficient than ANN. Hybrid classifier LR-ANN reduces FP rate and improves the accuracy.
Table 5.10 LR, ANN and Hybrid LR-ANN classifiers accuracy
performance.
Classifier Accuracy False Positive
Logistic regression 92,30% 8%
ANN 89,60% 11,50%
Hybrid (LR-ANN) 96% 4%
Summarizing the results of the above tables, we can state that the individual machine learning
classifiers have good performance on smartphone system calls dataset. The best classifier was
SVM with 8% false positive and 92.50% accuracy. The worst classifier was ANN with 11.50%
false positive and 89.60% accuracy. The hybrid classifiers achieved better performance than
individual ones. They have the lowest false positive (4%) and the highest accuracy (96%). The
worst prediction accuracy of hybrid classifier is LR-NB classifier with 6% of false positive
and 94.10% of accuracy. This prediction accuracy is better than the best individual classifiers
(SVM with 8% of false positive and 92.50% of accuracy). The hybrid classifiers improves the
classification accuracy compared to single classifiers.
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5.3 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has two main objectives: (i) investigate the impact of system call filtering and
abstraction process on the performance of machine learning classifiers, (ii) investigate different
models of benign behavior by implementing two machine learning classifiers from different
categories.
Comparing Table 5.2 and Table 5.4, it is clear that the capabilities of SVM classifier to discrim-
inate between malicious and benign applications are better than the capabilities of the k-means
classifier. For example, for the raw traces, the SVM classifier detects around 92.30% of mal-
ware and misses only around 7.66%, while the one-class k-means detects around 81.80% of
malware and misses around 18.20%. The significant difference between classifiers in the five
performance metrics clearly illustrates that the two-class SVM classifier is more discriminative
and suitable to malware detection application. The SVM classifier is a discriminative classi-
fier, and its training process is based on learning the boundaries of the classes, while k-means
is generative classifier, and its training is based on learning the density distribution of the target
class.
Unlike the accuracy performance, there are not huge differences between the space complexity
of the two selected classifiers. However, the time complexity of the SVM classifier is better
than k-means classifier. Table 5.11 summarizes the time and space complexities of the training
phase of the two classifiers.
The testing phase complexity is usually very fast since the testing phase uses the learnt model
for classification.
Table 5.11 SVM and k-means time and memory complexities.
Classifier Time complexity Space complexity
SVM O(n2) or O(n3) O(n)
k-means O(n×d× k× l) O((n+ k)×d)
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As illustrated previously, the filtering and abstraction process has positive impacts on the ac-
curacy performance of the two classifiers. For example, the false positive of the k-means is
improved by reducing the false alarm rate from 22,50% to 8,90% as well as the SVM false
positive is reduced from 7,70% to 0%.
The filtering and abstraction process also impacts the time and space complexities positively.
Reducing the number of features d, the number of centroid k and the parameter C impacts
positively the space and time complexities of the k-means and the SVM as illustrated in ta-
ble 5.11. The number of features d is reduced by more than 50%, which means the filtering
and abstraction process reduces the memory usage by more than 50%.
In conclusion, the SVM is more accurate than k-means. Therefore, it is preferable for anomaly-
based detection system when a sufficient number of malicious and benign applications are
available. The k-means is significantly improved by adding the filtering and abstraction pro-
cess, and it can be used in anomaly-based detection system when only one class dataset is
available.
Further study and evaluation would have to be done eventually with other classifiers such as
one-class SVM and GMM for one-class classifiers, as well as decision tree and naïve bayes,
etc. for two-class classifiers with system calls dataset and other dataset, such as requested
permission and API.
Hybrid machine learning classifiers improve the prediction precision of individual classifiers
with extra space and time complexities. Filtering and abstraction process improves the pre-
diction precision of the SVM (individual classifiers) more than hybrid classifiers and with less
space and time complexities.

CONCLUSION
In this Thesis, we address the malware detection problem on smartphone systems. Smartphone
popularity has grown over the last few years due to different reasons, such as:
• Smartphone system’s interface is attractive, simple and easy to use. As a result, new users
get acquainted with the use of different functions quickly.
• Smartphone systems allow users to stay connected with personal and business life. Users
have Internet access all the time, and they can send emails, update Facebook profiles, access
bank account information, pay bills, and accept or decline appointments. These facts allow
users to save time.
• Nowadays, smartphone systems are affordable. Smartphone companies keep improving the
smartphone systems capabilities and functions, while at the same time lowering prices.
• The most important reason of this popularity is the third-party applications. Users can
develop and run applications on their devices. These applications add more functions that
make smartphone systems so desirable, useful and serviceable.
Due to the functions, services and popularity of smartphone systems, users store confidential
information and make confidential operations and transactions on their devices. The popularity
of smartphone systems along with their ability to store confidential information are two main
factors that attract cyber criminals and malware developers.
Smartphone malwares are becoming more and more dangerous and complex to detect. The
last report of kaspersky lab (Chebyshev and Unuchek, 2014) reported shocking results. Over
143,000 new malwares were detected, around 4 million installation packages were used to
distribute malwares, and approximately 10 million unique malicious installation packages were
detected. These results show the rapid increase and the serious threats of smartphone malwares.
In light of this rapid increase and advanced techniques used by malwares targeting smartphone
systems, there is crucial need to develop effective solutions to protect these systems. The
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literature review on this subject has shown that the two main techniques used to detect malwares
were: signature-based techniques and anomaly-based techniques (Amamra et al., 2012b). Each
technique has its strengths and drawbacks, and no single technique is expected to detect all
types of malwares. Therefore, they are complementary in detecting malwares.
In this Thesis, we focus on anomaly-based detection techniques. Anomaly-based techniques
are more resisting to evasion attacks and obfuscation techniques, as well as they can detect
unknown malwares and variant of known malwares. However, these techniques still suffer
from two main problems:
• They still need more investigations and improvements to increase the prediction accuracy.
The main factors impacting the prediction accuracy are:
- The data used to represent the application behavior is not representative enough and/or
their amount is insufficient.
- The behavior model describing the benign application is inadequate and its parameters
are poorly optimized.
• Smartphone systems have limited resources environments which limit the complexity of
the adopted anomaly detection techniques. Thereby, the solution should consume as less
system resources as possible.
The objective of this Thesis is to propose novel and efficient anomaly detection solutions to
detect malwares on smartphone system based Android OS. The target solution should be ac-
curate, adaptable and scalable. In addition, it should be compacted and optimised enough to
respect the resource limitations of the smartphone systems.
To reach this objective, this Thesis introduced contributions on three different levels: (1)liter-
ature review study, (2) the data used to represent the behavior of applications and (3) the used
benign behavior model. The contributions are presented briefly in the next paragraphs.
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To understand the current trends of smartphone malware detection techniques and identify the
possible paths to improve the existing solutions or propose new ones, a survey of the mal-
ware detection techniques for smartphone systems is introduced in Chapter 2. This survey
presents a comprehensive review of the existing detection techniques and provides a taxonomy
of these techniques according to well defined rules. These rules are: the reference behavior,
the analysis technique, the benign behavior model and the used data to represent the benign
behavior (Amamra et al., 2012b).
Chapter 3 presents dataset level contributions, which provide representative dataset that can
be used to design accurate anomaly detection solutions. In this Thesis, The Linux system call
trace is selected. System call traces have several advantages. they are simple, closer to the
real behavior of applications and good discriminator. The dataset contribution is twofold: the
feature vector representation (Amamra et al., 2013) and the system call filtering and abstraction
process (Amamra et al., 2014).
Feature vector representation is the format adopted to organize and encode the data. In prior
work, successive system calls and frequency distribution (bag) of system calls feature vectors
are used in the prior work. A new one, the frequency of short patterns system calls is exam-
ined, this feature vector combines successive and frequency information of system calls. The
experiment results illustrate the significant impact of the feature vector representation on the
prediction accuracy of the classifiers. The pattern frequency feature vectors improve the pre-
diction accuracy of all tested classifiers. For example, SVM classifier has low performance
with the bag of system calls representation (92.50% accuracy rate and 8.50% false positive
rate). This performance is enhanced by using (two and three)-pattern frequency representation
to 100% accuracy rate and 0% false positive rate on limited number of applications.
Pattern frequency system calls feature vectors have extra computational and space cost. The
memory complexity of the l-pattern frequency of system calls representation is in O(N×|∑ |l),
where N is the number of traces, |∑ | is number of system calls and l is length of pattern. It
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consumes more memory than the bag of system calls representation and less than the successive
system calls representation.
The second contribution of dataset level is the process for filtering and abstracting system
calls. The is in fact the one of the two main contributions of this Thesis. This process consists
of two phases: the filtering phase and the abstraction phase (Amamra et al., 2014). The first
one removes the system calls that do not represent the main behavior of an application, such
as memory management system calls, system calls to check the available resources, system
calls to obtain process information, inter-process system calls and failed system calls. The
abstraction module considers the system calls of similar functions and different names as one
system call. For example, read(), readv(), pread() and fread() are unified to read() system calls.
The filtering and abstraction process produces refined traces that are much more compact than
raw traces. This improves the system resources consumption and it is much more representative
of the main behavior of applications, which positively impacts the prediction accuracy of the
solution. The evaluation of the refined traces vs raw traces is presented in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 presents a novel canonical database normal behavior model. This model is an exten-
sion to the classical lightweight anomaly detection approach proposed by (Forrest et al., 1996).
The normal behavior of a legitimate privileged process is represented by a database composed
of all the unique system call patterns of a given length k encountered during a training phase.
In our context, there are millions of Android applications and building the specific database for
each of these applications. Therefore, this approach has the following limitations:
• It is impossible for third party to build separated databases for all these applications.
• It is not possible to detect a malware for which no legitimate database is available.
• Any application update will increase false positive.
Hence, our solution builds a canonical database representing generic benign behavior of An-
droid applications. This database is constructed from a limited number of representative appli-
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cations. Once the canonical database has been built, it can be used to detect anomaly of new
applications. When a pattern does not exist in the database, such pattern is considered as a
mismatch and may present an anomalous behavior (Amamra et al., 2014). The efficiency of
this approach is based on two things:
• The algorithm used to check the existence of the new patterns in the database.
• The method used to evaluate the anomaly strength of a new application.
Due to their efficiency, multi-pattern matching algorithms are suitable to verify the existence
of new patterns in the canonical database. In (Amamra et al., 2012a), we have selected four
algorithms using different matching approaches. These algorithms are: Aho-Corasick (AC)
algorithm (Aho and Corasick, 1975; Amamra et al., 2012a) uses finite automaton approach,
Commentz-Walter (CW) algorithm (Commentz-Walter, 1979; Amamra et al., 2012a) uses fi-
nite automaton heuristic approach, Wu-Manber (WM) algorithm (Wu et al., 1994; Amamra
et al., 2012a) uses hash-heuristic approach and Set backward Oracle Matching (SBOM) algo-
rithm (Amamra et al., 2012a) uses factor approach. Those algorithms have been implemented
and tested on a smartphone device. We identify the used memory and the available one, we
then determine the budget of each algorithm according to the number of patterns. The AC
algorithm has been selected because it runs in linear time in all cases, which means that the
algorithm has stable performance.
In prior work, the anomaly strength of an application trace is measured by two methods: the
number of mismatches without considering the level of mismatches (Forrest et al., 1996, 2008)
and the maximum level of mismatches without considering the number of mismatches (Hofmeyr
et al., 1998). These two methods are not sufficient representative of the anomaly of a trace (as
discussed in section 4.2). Therefore, a new method called weighted anomaly level is intro-
duced to measure the anomaly (Amamra et al., 2014). This method takes in consideration both
the number of mismatches and the maximum level of mismatches. The experiments show this
method is very representative of the anomaly of applications traces.
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Canonical database approach is evaluated on both raw and refined traces and measuring the
anomaly by maximum level of mismatches and weighted anomaly level. The experiment re-
sults show the approach on the raw traces has good performance, where it consumes limited
system resources (memory and CPU) and has good prediction accuracy. On refined traces, the
accuracy and execution performances are improved, i.e. the system resources consumption is
lesser and the prediction accuracy is higher. This is the second main contribution of this Thesis.
This approach can be seen as the last line of defence in a defence-in-depth mechanism. Ideally,
a pattern database should be provided for an application by the application developer. Such
database should be very accurate.
Chapter 5 reviews and compares the efficiency of two main categories of machine learning clas-
sifiers and evaluate the impact of filtering and abstraction process on each category (Amamra
et al., 2015). Machine learning classifiers can be generative classifiers (one-class classifier)
or discriminative classifiers(multi-class classifier) (Ulusoy and Bishop, 2006; Bishop et al.,
1995). SVM classifier represents the discriminative classifier category and k-means classifier
represents the generative classifier category. The experiment results show the prediction accu-
racy performances of the two classifiers, and it is clear the two-class SVM classifier is more
discriminative and suitable for malware detection applications. The filtering and abstraction
process positively impacts both the resource usage and prediction accuracy of the two classi-
fiers. The false positive rate is very important measure to evaluate the efficiency of anomaly
detection solutions. We compare the false positive rate of the two classifiers before and after
filtering abstraction process. The k-means false alarm rate can be reduced from 22.50% to
8.90% after the filtering and abstraction process. The SVM false positive rate can be reduced
from 7.70% to 0%.
Chapter 6 presents hybrid machine learning classifiers. Hybrid classifier is a set of classifiers
whose single predictions are combined in some way to classify new samples (Amamra et al.,
2012c). Hybrid classifiers use the output of the classifiers without considering details of their
implementation.
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The study presented in this Thesis can be extended and enhanced in future work in three main
directions: (1) more representative dataset of application behavior, (2) more discriminative
algorithms between benign and malware behavior, and (3) hybrid framework use system calls
to represent benign behavior and others to represent malwares.
In first direction, system calls filtering and abstraction process still needs more investigation
and improvement. Fine-grained filtering criteria should produce more representative data of
application behavior. System calls data can be more representative of application behavior by
adding addition information about application behavior such as arguments of system calls and
resource access events. Explore other data than system calls especially static ones could be
more representative and discriminative.
In the second direction, new algorithms and models should be investigated, explored and
adapted with smartphone system anomaly detection specifications, such as new machine learn-
ing classifier never investigated, finite state machine (FSM) to model the normal behavior. In
this model, the states describe the past, the transitions indicate the change from state to other
according to specific conditions and the actions describe the activities. FSM model have shown
good performance in network anomaly detection.
In the last direction, hybrid framework consists of two databases, one represents the generic
normal behavior and other represents malwares generic behavior. This framework should en-
hance the detection rate and reduces the false positive rate.
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